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1. INTRODUCTION
Safety is an important issue everywhere and at all timesin the home, in
schools, and in industry as well as within the aviation community. The safety of a
system is dependent upon the reliability of the components of which it consists. In the
context of aircraft systems, these components include the aircraft itself, the operating
environment, and the flightcrew. Although civil aviation operations are relatively safe
and commercial air travel is reliable in comparison to other forms of transportation,
aircraft accidentswhether or not they are fataldraw immediate public attention and
a great deal of concern. Research conducted from the perspective of passengersand
not aircraft manufacturers or airline companieshas indicated that "the [aviation]
system is growing less safe" (Nader & Smith, 1994, p. xx) since some of the following
critical safety issues have been neglected or ignored:
1. The economic near-collapse of the industry after the airlines were
deregulated;
2. Pressure from the airline industry to increase capacity, which has caused the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to approve compromises in safety
procedures and to contemplate further changes of this nature;
3. The aging of the aircraft fleet;
4. The obsolescence of the current air traffic control (ATC) equipment and the
failure of the FAA to direct that it be modernized.2
5. The growth of commuter airlines that fly smaller planes with less
comprehensive safety equipment;
6. The need to substantially upgrade the crash survivability of most commercial
transport jets;
7. Problems with human factors such as management and pilot performance that
adversely affect safety;
8. The threat of sabotage and criminal attacks against airplanes and the
relatively feeble security measures taken to prevent such actions;
9. The need to improve ground control technology to prevent accidents from
happening while planes are on the ground; and
10. FAA underfunding that has overwhelmed an already too-passive agency,
rendering it unable to fully perform its legal mandate.
The present research addresses the issue of aviation human factors, the seventh
element of the concerns listed above. The discipline of aviation human factors
encompasses "cockpit organization, crew interaction, fitness for duty (fatigue, health),
judgment, sensory illusions, distraction, and complacency induced by reliability of
equipment" (Lederer, 1988, p. xv). One of the major goals of human factors studies is
reduction of the rate of human errors and development of the means to mitigate the
undesirable consequences of errors when they occur. Though the statistics differ from
one study to next, there has been general agreement that approximately two-thirds of all
aircraft accidents are attributable at least partially to errors by flightcrew, or so-called
pilot errors (Foushee & Helmreich, 1988; Nagel, 1988; Oster, Strong, & Zorn, 1992;
Hawkins, 1993; Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 1994).3
In the cockpit, the pilot is charged with two different levels of tasks: moment-
to-moment aircraft controls and management of flight tasks. As an aircraft controller,
the pilot performs such lower level tasks as maintaining airspeed and changing altitude;
as a system manager, the pilot is charged with such higher level tasks as making plans
and decisions. In today's highly automated aircraft, the role of the pilot has changed
from that of airplane controller to systems manager. While the use of automatic
devices has relieved modern pilots of lower level tasks, at the same time it has increased
pilot responsibility for higher level systems manager tasks. Consequently, this change
in role has altered the characteristics of pilot errors. Pilots may now make more errors
performing managerial tasks than they do performing control tasks. Funk (1991)
referred to this management-level activity as cockpit task management (CTM).
The basis for the present research follows from prior studies of CTM errors by
Funk (1989, 1991), Chou (1990, 1991), and Madhavan (1993). Funk developed a
preliminary CTM theory from the perspective of systems engineering; and Chou and
Madhavan reviewed aircraft accident and incident reports, verifying the significance of
CTM errors in those mishaps. To facilitate CTM and to reduce CTM-related pilot
errors, the present study has included the development and evaluation of a prototype
pilot-vehicle interface (PVI), the cockpit task management system (CTMS). Based
upon findings from an effectiveness evaluation experiment, a set of design guidelines
for a real-world CTMS is also proposed.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background
information necessary to an understanding of the present project, including descriptions
of previously conducted general human error and pilot error studies, and an
introduction to the concept of CTM and the nature of CTM error, as well as the4
objectives of the research. Chapter 3 describes methodology used to conduct the
research. The flight simulator used is described in the first section, whereas the second
section provides a discussion of CTMS design and implementation. Description of
CTMS operations in conjunction with the flight simulator is also provided in this
section. Two types of flight scenarios are described in the third section: (a) training
scenarios used to familiarize subjects with simulator flights and (b) data-collection
scenarios used for the acquisition of subject performance data. The fourth and final
section in Chapter 3 provides a description of the experiment performed to evaluate the
effectiveness of the CTMS, including a discussion of the subjects used, experimental
design, experimental procedures, performance measures, and the data collection
scheme. Chapter 4 presents the results obtained from the experiment, including a
discussion of how the results were analyzed. Chapter 5 presents a general discussion of
the research project, including CTMS effectiveness, the contributions and limitations of
the research, and a proposed set of design guidelines for a real-world CTMS. Finally,
Chapter 6 presents a summary of and conclusions derived from the study.5
2. BACKGROUND
Aircraft safety has long been a big issue to the public as well as to the aviation
community. Aircraft accidents are very rare events and air travel has been one of the
safest forms of transportation. Being equipped with sophisticated automation using
advanced modern technology, aircraft systems today are very reliable and air travel has
become safer than ever. However, air accidents still occur with disastrous results and
enormous loss of life and property.It has been known that approximately two-thirds of
all aircraft accidents are the result of pilot error.
2.1Human Error
To err is human. Since errors are an essential part of human nature, it is
inevitable that humans will err. In the context of a man-machine system, human error
can be formally defined as "an inappropriate or undesirable human decision or behavior
that reduces, or has the potential for reducing, effectiveness, safety or system
performance" (Sanders & McCormick, 1993, p. 656).
In general, the study of human error is considered a subfield of human factors.
Human factors, or ergonomics, is a field of study whose focus is on people in a system.
It is the study about people themselves such as their capabilities and limitations, as well
as about their relationship with machines, equipment, facilities, procedures, and
environment. The history of human factors as an independent discipline, is relatively
short, although its origin may be further back. "It was in the late 1940s in the United
Kingdom (UK) that an interdisciplinary group of scientists who had been engaged upon6
a variety of human problems associated with the war effort took the decision to form a
society concerned with the human aspects of the working environment" (Edwards, 1988,
p. 4). The discipline was institutionalized by the founding of the Ergonomics Research
Society (now the Ergonomics Society) in the UK in 1949, and the Human Factors
Society in the United States in 1957. In large part, human factors focuses its efforts on
designing things that reduce human error and enhance system performance. Minimizing
the occurrence of human error has been a major goal of human factors.
It is generally agreed that 60 to 90 percent of major accidents and incidents in
complex systems, such as power plants and ships, are attributable to human operator
error (Rouse, 1983; Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1990; Wickens, 1992). For the last decade,
great public awareness and concern about human error has been raised through a
number of tragic accidents including the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident
in 1979, the Bhopal chemical plant accident in 1984, the Challenger explosion and the
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, and the sinking of the ferry boat Herald of Free
Enterprise in 1987. A great deal of effort has been made to understand and learn about
human error by many researchers for a long time. They identified errors, organized and
classified them, developed error models, and proposed principles to prevent the errors
or to mitigate the effects.
Human error has been classified in various perspectives. Sully is known as the
first psychologist who attempted to "classify the broad spectrum of human error and to
seek common explanatory principles" (Reason, 1990, p. 20). In his book entitled
Illusions, which was published in 1881 and now has become "a classic in the field of
error studies," (p. 20) Sully illustrated "the way he sought common features among
errors arising from different cognitive domains" (p. 20). He classified errors in terms7
of four modes of cognition: external perception, introspection, memory, and belief.
This major dimension of his taxonomy was subsequently incorporated with the second
dimension which consists of active and passive modes, depending upon whether an error
arises "out of spontaneous activity within the individual" (p. 20) or "due primarily to
external factors" (p. 20). In this way, errors can be classified into eight categories,
although he did not "make rigid categorical distinctions" (p. 20).
Generally and conveniently, human error can be divided into two fundamental
categories depending on whether the actor has an intention or not: intentional and
unintentional errors. Norman (1988) called them mistakes and slips, which have
become standard terms in the field of error studies. Swain and Guttmann (1983)
developed an error taxonomy based on the characteristics of individual, discrete actions
involved in the error. They divided errors into two broad categories, errors of omission
and errors of commission, with further breakdowns from errors of commission into four
subcategories: selection error, sequence error, time error, and qualitative error. An
error of omission occurs when a person fails to perform an act, and an error of
commission occurs when a person performs an act incorrectly. A selection error occurs
when a wrong item or incorrect control mode is chosen, and a sequence error occurs
when a task is performed out of sequence. A time error occurs when a task or step is
performed too early, too late, or not within the time allowed. A qualitative error occurs
when a task is over- or less-performed such as a poorly made weld (Kantowitz &
Sorkin, 1983; Sanders & McCormick, 1993). Rasmussen (1980) used an information
processing model to classify human error. He divided different types of control
behaviors by human, which are depicted in the model, into three levels:skill-, rule-,
and knowledge-based behaviors (Figure 2.1). Depending on the type of behavior8
involved, errors are classified into three categories:skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based
errors.
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Figure 2.1 Schematic illustration of categories of human data processes
and typical errors (from Rasmussen, 1980).
Based on the studies of human error, researchers developed design principles of
man-machine systems. A philosophy that most errors are situation or design caused,
rather than human caused, was employed as the starting point to the approach. They
believed that better design could prevent or reduce human errors and disastrous
consequences of the errors.
Swain (1973) proposed some ergonomics principles for design of industrial
tasks in which 31 "ergonomics principles and their implications for improving human
performance in production" (p. 3) were presented. Norman (1988) developed seven
design principles for "transforming difficult tasks into simple ones" (p. 188) based on9
his studies of "the psychology of everyday things" (p. 188), which he called POET in
short. The principles were:
1. Use both knowledge in the world and knowledge in the head;
2. Simplify the structure of tasks;
3. Make things visible: bridge the gulfs of execution and evaluation;
4. Get the mappings right;
5. Exploit the power of constraints, both natural and artificial;
6. Design for error; and
7. When all else fails, standardize.
Adopting some of the elements from the Norman's principle, Wickens (1992) came up
with four "equipment design remedies to reduce the affordance for errors" (p. 436):
1. Minimize perceptual confusions;
2. Make the execution of action and the response of the system visible to the
operator;
3. Use constraints to "lock out" the possibility of errors; and
4. Avoid multimode systems.
Their common goal, through the efforts of developing principles, was to design an
error-preventive system to reduce the opportunities of human errors or to design error-
tolerant systems to allow for the errors.
2.2Pilot Error
Human errors committed by the flightcrew in a cockpit is called pilot error.
Aviation safety, especially safety in civil jet transportation, has been a great public10
concern despite the exceptional safety records compared to other forms of
transportation. The public seems to be intolerant of aircraft accidents because of their
tragic results.It is even more so when the term "pilot error" appears in the description
of the causes of the accidents. Investigations of aircraft accidents made it clear that
pilot error was the primary causal factor to the accidents. Many statistical data have
indicated that about two-thirds of all air accidents are attributable to errors by the
cockpit crew (Nagel, 1988; Oster, Strong, & Zorn, 1992; Helmreich & Foushee, 1993).
A great deal of effort has been made to solve the problem of pilot error. One of
the earliest studies on pilot error was done by McFarland (1946). In his study on
human factors issues in aircraft design and operation, he stated that "since the human
element is perhaps the most unstable unit in the entire man-machine relationship, more
attention should be given to its effects on aircraft design and operation. Until the
airman, who naturally is subject to human error, is no longer the determining factor, the
utmost in dependability and safety cannot be assured" (p. 1).
Through the study of aircraft accidents and incidents, McFarland identified the
following pilot errors in which inadequate consideration of human factors in design may
have been involved: (a) mislocation and inadvertent use of controls; (b) confusion in
reading or in setting instrument dials; (c) misinterpretation of identification lights,
instruments, and controls by visual illusions; (d) inadequate use of two different flying
modesinstrument and contact flying; and (e) inadequate vision in air transport
operations at night.
He developed a number of design principles in the following categories: (a) the
general arrangement and individual requirements of crew stations on large aircraft,
(b) the functional grouping and operation of controls, (c) the design of the instrument11
panel, (d) vision from the cockpit and the design of the windshield, and (e) the
illumination of the cockpit and control cabin.
While McFarland's study was very comprehensive and directed toward the
emphasis on human factors in general, Fitts and Jones (1947a; 1947b) focused their
study on the problem of pilot error. Fitts and Jones conducted two different studies on
two different types of pilot error: errors in operating controls and errors in reading and
interpreting instruments. In conducting the two studies, however, the same format was
used. That is, they collected and analyzed pilot errors, classified them, and developed
recommendations in both studies.
In their first study, 460 errors in operating aircraft controls were collected and
analyzed. They found that the control errors could be classified under six major
categories as follows: (a) substitution errors, (b) adjustment errors, (c) forgetting
errors, (d) reversal errors, (e) unintentional activation of controls, and (f) inability to
reach controls. Their recommendation to reduce these errors includes: uniform pattern
arrangement of controls, shape-coding of control knobs, more effective warning system,
adequate separation of controls, simplified one-step operation of wheels and flaps, more
functional check lists, and application of existing anthropometric data on body size.
In the second study, they analyzed 270 errors in reading and interpreting aircraft
instruments. They classified the errors into nine major categories: (a) errors in
interpreting multirevolution instrument indications, (b) reversal errors, (c) signal
interpretation errors, (d) legibility errors, (e) substitution errors, (f) using an instrument
that is inoperative, (g) scale interpretation errors, (h) errors due to illusions, and
(i) forgetting errors. They believed that "the nature of instrument-reading errors is
such that it should be possible to eliminate most of the errors by proper design of12
instruments" (Fitts & Jones, 1947b, p. 2). Their suggestions to reduce theerrors
include: (a) providing more uniform distribution of ultraviolet lightover the instrument
panel; (b) providing adequate safeguards to insure that markingson all instruments and
controls cannot become illegible from dirt, grease, wear, and fading; (c) providing
uniform pattern arrangement of instrument on the panel; (d) providing uniform and
distinctive dials for instruments that can be confused; and (e) developinga simplified
mechanical check list.
The purpose of the two studies by Fitts and Jones (1947a; 1947b)was to
"determine methods of designing and locating aircraft controls" (1947a,p. 1) and
"determine methods of designing aircraft instruments so as to improve pilot efficiency
and reduce the frequency of accidents" (1947b, p. 1). Their studies on the two types of
pilot errors were an attempt to reduce pilot-error accidents through better design of
displays and controls in a cockpit.
In an attempt to reduce display-related pilot error, Roscoe (1968) developed six
principles in designing flight and navigation display systems: (a) the principle of
display integration, (b) the principle of pictorial realism, (c) the principle of the moving
parts, (d) the principle of pursuit tracking, (e) the principle of frequency separation,
and (f) the principle of optimum scaling. These principles were later applied to design
flight instrument gauges in a cockpit. His study was an effort to improve display
layout of the instrument panel, through which information is logically grouped and
effectively coded for easy interpretation and precise control of the aircraft.
Allnutt (1982) tried to find out indirect, but rather fundamental causal factors to
pilot error through the review of some research about human behavior. Unlike other
analyses of accident causes which explain what kinds of erroneous events happened in13
an accident, he focused on why such erroneous events occurred. By considering types
of pilot errors which are appropriate to human behavioral areas, he classified major
causal factors into seven categories: information transfer, visual illusions, false
hypothesis, habit, motivation, stress and stressful environments, and fatigue.
As an aircraft system becomes complicated, new types of problems and concerns
have emerged. One of the phenomena found out in a full mission simulation study on
pilot performance with regard to errors, vigilance, and decision making, was the lack of
the captain's ability to effectively manage cockpit resources including flightcrew and
instruments available to him (Ruffell Smith, 1979). The result of another study on
incidents and accidents in civil jet transport also made it clear that crew interaction and
communication in a cockpit should be more emphasized (Lauber, 1979). Being
stimulated by the results of these studies as well as many others which addressed the
issue of crew resource management (CRM), a number of airlines have added CRM
training to their pilot training programs (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993).
In Nagel's (1988) relatively comprehensive study on pilot error, he described
three major types of errors: information acquisition and processing* errors, decision
errors, and action errors. He found out that with respect to information acquisition and
processing, "errors are minimized when the human is allowed to make the fewest
number of transformations to match an internal, cognitive representation of the
situation" (p. 283). He also found out that "the human decision maker is used only to
gather data and to implement decisions made" (p. 291) in many approaches to improve
overall decision performance, as shown in Figure 2.2 (a). Nagel proposed an
"improved" decision-aiding architecture as shown in Figure 2.2 (b), in which "the
computer gathers information, presents it in such a fashion to properly bias the human,14
and suggests a range of alternatives" (p. 291). For reducing action errors, he asserted
that systems should be made insensitive as well as intolerant to human errors. He also
suggested the use of new technology, such as artificial intelligence, to develop an error-
insensitive and error-tolerant cockpit.
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Figure 2.2 Two decision-aiding architectures: (a) limited rate for human
decision maker; and (b) improved version with more active role
for human decision maker (from Nagel, 1988).
Edwards (1988) described pilot error using a conceptual model called SHEL.
The SHEL model, named after the initial letter of its four components, consists of three
types of system resource called hardware, software, and liveware, and their
environment (Figure 2.3). The hardware comprises the physical objects such as
buildings, vehicles, and equipment. The software encompasses the non-physical aspects
of the system such as rules, regulations, orders, operating procedures, and computer
programs. The liveware, the third resource, is human. The environment is the context
in which the three resources are operated, such as economic, political, and social
factors.15
Figure 2.3 Edwards' SHEL model (from Edwards, 1988).
The SHEL model contains seven types of interfaces through which "energy and
information are interchanged" (Edwards, 1988, p. 11). They are L-H, L-S, L-E, H-S,
H-H, S-S, and L-L interfaces. Edwards saw human factors as a "discipline based upon
the study of the L component and concerned with the design and management of those
system interfaces which include L: namely, L-E, L-H, L-S, and L-L" (p. 17). He
considered these interfaces as four sources of pilot error in an aircraft system. For
example, Fitts and Jones (1947b) found out that "the altimeter was misread more
frequently than any other single instrument" (p. 8) through their study described earlier
in this section. Edwards (1988) considered the altimeter as "an error source at the L-H
interface" (p. 18). According to his analogy, the six principles developed by Roscoe
(1968) and the CRM (crew resource management) training program, which were
described earlier in this section, can be considered as two attempts to enhance the L-S
interface and the L-L interface, respectively.16
Hawkins (1993) also used the SHEL model to describe pilot error. He adopted
Edwards' SHEL model and modified it for better fit to the scope of human factors.
Hawkins' SHEL model, like Edwards', is composed of four components: software,
hardware, environment, and liveware. Unlike Edwards' model, however, Hawkins used
a "building block" model (Figure 2.4). In the center of his SHEL model is the human,
the liveware, which he considered "the most valuable as well as the most flexible
component in the system" (p. 22). The H-S, H-H, and S-S interfaces, which have no
interaction with the liveware, were not considered in his model. Like Edwards,
Hawkins also saw the four interfaces in the model as four sources of error when there is
a mismatch between components.
S
L-S
interface
L-H interface
L-E
interface
L-L interface
Figure 2.4 Hawkins' SHEL model (from Hawkins, 1993).
Unlike the studies listed above, which are direct efforts to solve the problem of
pilot errors, more fundamental and basic studies on air accidents and incidents are
being led by two organizations in the United States. These are the U.S. National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS).17
The NTSB is a government organization that is responsible for investigating
major transportation accidents including air accidents. After each accident
investigation, the NTSB issues a report which comprises information on causal factors
to the accident and safety recommendations. In general, the recommendations are
addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Congress, as well as other
private organizations such as airlines or manufacturers.
The ASRS, sponsored financially by FAA and run by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)-Ames Research Center, receives incident reports
from volunteers such as pilots and air traffic controllers. One important aspect of the
ASRS is confidentiality for the reporters, so that they can report any violation without
fear of punishment. ASRS reports are vital because potential causal factors to
accidents could be revealed before they actually lead to an accident. According to
NASA (1994), the ASRS has received over 261,000 reports during its eighteen years of
operation and now it receives more than 2,500 reports per month.
The immediate goals of NTSB and ASRS are solely to provide useful
information about aviation accidents and incidents. Studying of their reports has been
extremely valuable for research professionals to identify and understand pilot errors.
For a long period of time, these two organizations have greatly contributed to aviation
safety by providing in-depth reports.
2.3Cockpit Task Management (CTM)
In an aircraft cockpit, the pilot performs multiple and concurrent tasks to
accomplish the flight mission. For example, the pilot may have to simultaneously lower18
the landing gear and obtain an air traffic control (ATC) clearance while maintaining the
descent rate. The pilot has two principal cockpit roles: aircraft controller and system
manager. Like a driver in an automobile, the pilot as aircraft controller performs
operational-level tasks such as moment-to-moment manual control and
activation/deactivation of automatic devices. As system manager, like a factory
manager, the pilot performs such management-level tasks as monitoring system
configurations and making decisions. In other words, the pilot is in charge of managing
the multiple, concurrent flight tasks. Funk (1991) referred to this management-level
activity as cockpit task management (CTM).
Funk (1991) developed a "preliminary version of a normative theory of CTM"
(p. 272) to describe the managerial activity in a cockpit. For precise understanding of
the CTM theory, the terminology used to describe this theory is in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Terminology used in CTM theory.
Terminolo Descri tion
state a set of system attributes at a given time
status a level of satisfaction for a task
system behaviora discrete sequence or a continuous series of
system input,state,and output values over a time
interval
event a set of system behaviors in which some state
components change in a significant way at the end
of the time interval
goal a set of desired system behaviors
task a process that should be completed to cause a
system to achieve a goal
agenda a hierarchy of tasks to be completed during a
mission19
Funk (1991) viewed CTM as "a process by which the flightcrew manages an
agenda of cockpit tasks," (p. 277) and developed a procedure that describes CTM
activities as follows:
1. Create initial agenda.
2. Until mission goal is achieved or determined to be unachievable:
a. Assess current situation.
b. Activate tasks whose initial events have occurred.
c. Assess status of active tasks.
d. Terminate tasks with achieved or unachievable goals.
e. Assess task resource requirements.
f. Prioritize active tasks.
g. Allocate resources to tasks in order to priority:
1. Initiate newly activated high-priority tasks.
2. Interrupt low-priority tasks (if necessary).
3. Resume interrupted tasks (when possible).
h. Update agenda.
Thus, CTM activities include the initiation, monitoring, prioritization, allocation
of resources to, and termination of multiple, concurrent flight tasks. In addition to the
CTM procedure described above, CTM theory is comprised of task state and status
transitions. Figures 2.5 and 2.6, respectively, show task state and status transitions.
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initial initial goal
event event achieved or
imminent occurs unachievable
Figure 2.5 State transition of a task (from Funk, 1991).20
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Figure 2.6 Status transition of a task (based on Funk, 1991).
2.4Cockpit Task Management Error
Cockpit task management (CTM) errors occur when a flightcrew fails to
perform CTM functions satisfactorily. After considering the functions and possible
failures of the CTM procedures previously described, Chou and Funk (1990) developed
the CTM error taxonomy shown in Table 2.2.
Chou (1991) asserted that many air accidents can be explained as failures to
perform CTM functions correctly; that is, CTM errors by the flightcrew. One of the
examples provided was the crash of an Eastern Airlines L-1011 in the Florida
Everglades in 1972. The flightcrew was preoccupied with fixing an indicator for the
landing gear and failed to maintain safe altitude. At least two tasks were improperly
managed: aircraft control and landing gear indicator diagnosis. Chou concluded that
the flightcrew of the L-1011 committed a task prioritization, a resource allocation, and
task monitoring errors.21
Table 2.2 CTM error taxonomy (from Chou & Funk, 1990, p. 473).
CTM Functions Error
Task Initiation early
late
incorrect
lack
Task Monitoring lack
excessive
Task Prioritization high
low
Resource Allocation high
low
Task Interruption incorrect
Task Resumption lack
Task Termination early
late
lack
incorrect
After reviewing the abstracts of 324 NTSB air accident reports, Chou (1991)
found that almost 25 percent of these accidents involved significant CTM errors.
Among the 144 ASRS air incident reports examined, 15 percent were CTM-related.
While the Chou's (1991) study was primarily based on NTSB air accident reports,
Madhavan (1993) examined CTM errors based on ASRS incident reports, collecting
and reviewing a total of 470 reports. In the study, a revised version of Chou and
Funk's (1990) error taxonomy was proposed, wherein some redundant categories were
removed or combined (Table 2.3). The CTM errors identified in the ASRS reports were
classified under the revised taxonomy.
According to Madhavan's (1993) analysis. CTM errors were involved in almost
50 percent of the ASRS incidents he reviewed. Among the 349 CTM errors identified
in the 231 reports out of 470, 41.5% of the errors fell into the category of task
initiation, 35% were related to task prioritization, and 23.5% were related to task
termination. The results of the research conducted by Chou (1991) and Madhavan22
(1993) provided verification that CTM errors were significant factors in a large number
of air accidents and incidents.
Table 2.3 Madhavan's CTM error taxonomy (from Madhavan, 1993, p. 32).
General Level Specific Level
Task Initiation early
late
lack
Task Prioritization incorrect
Task Termination early
late
lack
2.5Research Objectives
Cockpit automation is, in part, an attempt to eliminate or reduce pilot errors
during flight. With the introduction of the state-of-the-art computer technology,
automatic devices have become more reliable and sophisticated. However, no matter
how advanced the automation, new types of pilot errors have been introduced and
identified in aircraft accidents and incidents. These automation-related pilot errors
have been a major research concern for many years.
One of the principal research interests of the present study is the existence of
cockpit automation in the absence of consideration of proper integration and valid
overall design philosophy. Automated devices have been added to cockpits to solve
specific problems without appropriate concern for overall system integration. The yaw
damper, traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS), and the ground proximity
warning system (GPWS) are among such examples. Wiener (1985; 1987; 1988) called
this phenomena "one box at a time" (1987, p. 167) or "let's just add one more23
computer" (1988, p. 444) approach, and proposed that cockpit automation should
address a coherent overall design philosophy. Norman (1990) expressed his concern
about the issues as follow: "Analyses and remedies that look at isolated segments are
apt to lead to local, isolated improvements, but they may also create new problems and
difficulties at the system level. Too often, the implementation of some new 'improved'
automatic system, warning signal, retraining, or procedure is really a sign of poor
overall design" (p. 5). Appropriate integration and overall design philosophy
underlying cockpit automation must be a solution to the problem of pilot error in the
cockpits of the future.
It has been frequently observed that designers have sometimes attempted to
eliminate pilot error by replacing humans, the sources of the error, with error-free
automatic devices under a concept intended to "automate human error out of the
system" (Wiener & Curry, 1982, p. 67). Even in highly sophisticated modern cockpits,
however, humans are still responsible for operating and monitoring the automated
devices to fly aircraft safely. Wiener (1987) asserted that "[cockpit] automation
essentially relocates and changes the nature and consequences of human error, rather
than removing it" (p. 179). The advanced cockpit "calls for more programming,
planning, sequencing, alternative selection, and more 'thinking,' or in psychological
terms, more cognitive processing" (Wiener, 1988, p. 447). As a result, changes in the
characteristics of cockpit tasks have increased the pilot's mental workload, especially
around terminal areas when the pilot is busy. Since the designers of automatic devices
have "emphasized reducing manual workload, not accounting adequately for mental
workload" (Wiener, 1988, p. 447), however, the pilot's management-level workload that
requires greater mental activity has been increased, while the operational-level24
workload has been reduced by automating routine manual tasks. Sufficient evidence
exists to indicate that the solution of automation-related pilot errors in the future
cockpits should be directed toward assisting the pilot with management-level tasks.
The CTM concept is an approach which addresses this issue.
Funk (1991), Chou (1991), and Madhavan (1993) proposed a pilot-vehicle
interface (PVI), the cockpit task management system (CTMS), to facilitate CTM and to
reduce CTM-related pilot errors. The CTMS can be viewed as an approach toward
integration of cockpit automation in the sense that it provides pilots with necessary
information after synthesizing the data from automated cockpit devices. The CTMS is
also a task-oriented or goal-oriented approach that should provide the basis for a valid
cockpit design philosophy. The objectives of the present study include:
1. Determination of the feasibility of CTMS implementation through the
development of a prototype CTMS;
2. Evaluation of CTMS effectiveness for improvement of CTM performance;
and
3. Development of design recommendations for CTMS implementation in a real
aircraft.25
3. METHOD
Based upon consideration of the required CTM (cockpit task management)
functions described in this chapter (section 3.2.1), a CTMS (cockpit task management
system) was designed. Concepts of object-oriented design (00D) and distributed
artificial intelligence (DAI) were employed in developing the CTMS. The CTMS
developed was then integrated into a PC-based flight simulator for experimental
evaluation of system effectiveness. For the experiment conducted, volunteer subjects
flew scenario simulations both with and without the CTMS. Performance datawas
collected and analyzed for the purpose of evaluating the CTMS.
The first section of this chapter provides a brief description of the flight
simulator displays and controls used for the experiment. The development of the
CTMS is described in the second section, including considerations of CTMS functions
and design architecture. Descriptions of the flight scenarios developed for the
experiment are provided in the third section. The final section of this chapter provides
explanations of the experiment performed to evaluate CTMS effectiveness, including
descriptions of the subjects, the basis for the experimental design, performance
measurements used, the experimental procedures, and the means of data collection.
3.1Flight Simulator
The flight simulator used for this research was a small, fixed-based model of an
aircraft cockpit for a single pilot (Figure 3.1).It was developed by modifying the
existing flight simulator used for a previous CTM study (Chou, 1991). The simulator26
consisted of three personal computers, each with its own monitor, a computer keyboard,
two trackballs, and a sidestick controller. All of the simulator computers were linked
via Ethernet, using the TCP/IP communication protocol.
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The top monitor (Figure 3.1) shows head up display (HUD) information. The
second and third monitors display simplified models of a cockpit instrument panel based
upon the panel descriptions of a B747-400 (Boeing Commercial Airplanes Company,
1989). The following three sections provide brief descriptions of the basic displays and
controls simulated on the monitors. Detailed descriptions of the CTMS display are
included in Basic Controls and Displays in Appendix A and Flight Manual in
Appendix B.27
3.1.1Head up display (HUD)
A HUD in a real airplane is a system that projects an image on a special
transparent glass panel called a combiner. Such information about flight data as
attitude, heading, altitude, and airspeed is displayed on a combiner mounted between
the pilot's eyes and the cockpit windshield. As the name implies, a HUD permits the
pilot to monitor flight data while keeping his/her "head up" to be able to maintain out-
the-window observation.
In the flight simulator, the top monitor was used to simulate the role of a HUD.
However, the out-the-window view was not simulated with an assumption that the
simulator flights performed were all night flights in which the pilot would be required to
fly by instruments. The simulator HUD displayed the following information (Appendix
A, SCREEN #1):
1. Command and current aircraft parameters (i.e. heading, airspeed, and
altitude);
2. Deviations between the command and current parameters;
3. A pitch ladder with artificial horizon, indicating aircraft pitch and roll angles;
4. Aircraft position in longitude and latitude; and
5. Autopilot status.
The computer program used to animate the HUD image was written in the
Microsoft OuickC programming language (version 2.5). The program was originally
developed by Adams (1988) and modified subsequently for CTM studies at Oregon
State University by David McDougald, William McCoy, and Chung-Di Chou (Chou,
1991). In accordance with research requirements, the program was modified a third28
time for the present study. For additional details, see Appendix A, Basic Controls and
Displays.
3.1.2Navigation display (ND)
The simulator ND consisted of four panels, as follows: a horizontal situation
indicator (HSI), an automatic flight control (AFC) panel, a source select panel, and an
air traffic control (ATC) communication panel (Appendix A, SCREEN 113).
The HSI displayed an aircraft-centered moving map consisting of an aircraft
symbol, the current flight path, and waypoint symbols and names. It also displayed the
aircraft position, active waypoint data, weather radar data, and an expanded compass
rose. Depending upon the mode selected by the ND mode selector in the AFC panel, the
HSI displayed data in two different formats. In MAP mode, the HSI displayed a track-
up moving map with a track-up, expanded compass rose; in PLAN mode, a north-up
moving map with a north-up, expanded compass rose was displayed. Also, using the
PLAN mode, the HSI displayed waypoints that were not in the current flight path as
well as those within the flight path. In general, MAP mode was selected to display the
current flight path for a normal flight condition, and PLAN mode was selected when it
was necessary to change the flight plan. For example, PLAN mode was the logical
selection to reroute the current flight path or to change command altitude in compliance
with an ATC command.
The AFC and the source select panels displayed computer-generated button and
knob images. These buttons or knobs were used to set the HSI display or a source
selector to the desired mode. A trackball was used to both -push" the buttons and29
"turn" the knobs. That is, to push a simulated button, the subject pilot was required to
place the cursor onto the button image and click the left trackball button; to turn a
knob, the cursor was placed onto the knob image while a trackball button was
clickedthe left button to turn the knob counterclockwise and the right button to turn it
clockwise.
The ATC communication panel provided a simplified data-link model. A data-
link is a means of electronic, rather than verbal, communication between ATC and the
flightcrew. Using the ATC panel, the pilot could send a message to as well as receive a
message from ATC. The panel could be set up to one of three modes, including:
request-to-ATC mode (REQ), acknowledge-to-ATC mode (ACK), or clear-ATC-panel
mode (CLR). The button in the panel, the "ATC button", was used to set the panel to
the desired mode or to perform an action associated with ATC communication. The
label on the ATC button indicated which mode would be set when the button was
pushed, or an action suggested to the pilot. For example, the ATC button labeled REQ
was pushed to compose a request to ATC and then send it, whereas the button labeled
ACK was pushed to send an acknowledgment to ATC. The ATC panel modes changed
in accordance with events which occurred during a simulation, such as pushing an ATC
button or the receipt of an ATC clearance. The transitions of the ATC panel mode are
described in Figure 3.2. Further detailed explanation of the ND is in Appendix A,
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3.1.3Subsystem display (SD)
The SD consisted of six control panels and two display panels. The control
panels included a cockpit display unit (CDU), an engine control panel, a gear control
panel, a flap control panel, a subsystem display control panel, and a throttle control
panel, whereas the display panels included the main EICAS (engine indication and crew
alerting system) and the auxiliary EICAS (Appendix A, SCREEN #4).
The SD control panels were used to control such aircraft subsystems as the
engine, the hydraulic system, and the electric system, as well as the landing gear and31
As for the ND, simulated buttons or knobs in the panels were pushed or turned using a
trackball.
The main EICAS displayed the primary engine indicators, such as engine
pressure ratio (EPR), low pressure compressor spool at the intake (N1), and exhaust
gas temperature (EGT), all the time. When the aircraft flaps were deployed, the flap
synoptic was displayed on the lower right area of this panel. The auxiliary EICAS
showed desired subsystem synoptics, displaying aircraft subsystem malfunctions
indicated by degree of severity. If a fault was serious, a red color was used; otherwise,
a yellow color was used. When a subsystem synoptic displayed was neither red nor
yellow, the subsystem was considered to be healthy. A complete SD description is
included in Appendix A, Basic Controls and Displays.
3.2Cockpit Task Management System (CTMS)
For the present project, a prototype CTMS was implemented based upon the
recommendations provided by Funk (1991), Chou (1991), and Madhavan (1993).
Concepts of object-oriented design (00D) and distributed artificial intelligence (DAI)
were employed in the CTMS implementation, whereby aircraft subsystems and flight
tasks were represented by conceptual software units referred to as "agents." Following
implementation, the CTMS was integrated into the flight simulator for the experimental
evaluation of its effectiveness (Figure 3.3).32
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Figure 3.3 Overall flight simulator structure after adding the CTMS.
3.2.1CTMS functions and goals
In the design guidelines proposed by Funk (1991) and Chou (1991), the
following functions were recommended for a CTM-oriented PVI:
1. Maintain a model of the flightcrew's task environment and the aircraft's
state;
2. Recognize the conditions for the initiation and termination of a task, and
inform the flightcrew to so engage in the absence of initiation or termination
action;
3. Assess task status and priorities and present them to the flightcrew;
4. Help the flightcrew determine task resource requirements;
5. Help the flightcrew prioritize tasks;
6. Help the flightcrew initiate tasks;
7. Help the flightcrew terminate tasks;
8. Help the flightcrew interrupt tasks; and33
9. Help the flightcrew resume interrupted tasks.
From a different perspective, Zachary and Ross (1991) recommendeda list of
task management functions for developing a human-computer interface (HCI) fora real-
time, multi-tasking system, as follows:
1. Alert the user of the need to perform tasks;
2. Help the user prioritize tasks;
3. Provide the user situation-specific decision structures; and
4. Offer to perform tasks automatically for the user.
The goals and required functions of the CTMS were developed from
recommendations by Funk (1991) and Chou (1991), as well as Zachary and Ross
(1991). Accordingly, CTMS goals were a set of target behaviors pursued, whereas
CTMS functions were the means to achieve the goals. As developed for the present
study, the CTMS goals include the following:
1. Help the flightcrew prioritize tasks;
2. Help the flightcrew initiate tasks;
3. Help the flightcrew terminate tasks;
4. Help the flightcrew interrupt tasks; and
5. Help the flightcrew resume interrupted tasks.
The CTMS performs the following functions to achieve these goals:
1. Provide information about task state;
2. Provide information about task status;
3. Provide information about task priority; and
4. Provide information describing relationships within and among tasks.34
3.2.2CTMS architecture
For the development of a CTMS architecture, the concept of distributed
artificial intelligence (DAI) was employed. Artificial intelligence (AI), a branch of
computer science, is a study of computer systems which to some degree behave as if
they are a reflection of human-like intelligence. An AI system attempts to solve
problems using embedded problem-solving information, identified as "knowledge." As
a subfield of AI, DAI is concerned with solving problems using multiple-distributed
systems. Each distributed system has limited problem-solving knowledge, and the DAI
system seeks solutions using a group of distributed systems capable of interacting with
one another.
In a number of DAI systems, problem-solving knowledge is distributed among a
collection of conceptual software objects, or "agents." Minsky (1986), who was among
the first to use this term in the field of DAI, conceived a block world in which non-
trivial jobs were completed through cooperation among a collection of agents, wherein
each agent performed only a single primitive task. Kamel and Syed (1987) adopted the
DAI concept and multiple agents for the design of a process-planning system, OMAPS
or object-oriented multiple agent planning system. In this approach, a problem was
decomposed into a number of subproblems, and specific agents were assigned to
generate plans for the solution of specific subproblems.
In the domain of aviation human factors, the concept of multiple agents was
used to develop a prototype PVI, the Task Support Subsystem (TSS), the function of
which was in part to facilitate CTM (Funk, 1989). In the TSS, aircraft subsystems and
pilot tasks were represented by "system agents" (SAs) and "task agents" (TAs),
respectively. As developed for the present study, the CTMS adopted the basic35
architecture of the TSS, wherein it is an object-oriented system in which problem-
solving knowledge is distributed among SAs and TAs (Figure 3.4).
Despite the similarity in the basic architecture and some of their functions, there
are significant differences between the TSS and the CTMS. First, the principal TSS
function was to help pilots executerather than managetasks, and the primary
CTMS function is to facilitate CTM. Second, the TSS was an ad hoc system developed
in the absence of a firm theoretical background, whereas the CTMS was developed
based upon CTM theory and DAI concepts. Third, the TSS has never been thoroughly
evaluated in terms of CTM performance, whereas for the present study, CTM
performance constitutes the principal measures for the evaluation of the CTMS.
Finally, the research domains for the two systems are different in that the domain of the
TSS was a tactical military aircraft, and the present project has focused upon the
development of the CTMS for commercial transport aircraft applications.
3.2.3CTMS implementation
The CTMS was implemented using Smalltalk, an object-oriented computer
programming language. Smalltalk consists of a hierarchical structure of classes,
wherein instances of a class represent the objects or entities of that class. Then, the
behaviors of the instances are characterized by the methods of the class. A Smalltalk
object accesses another object by means of a "message-passing" mechanism. That is,
when an instance, as a Smalltalk object, sends a message to another instance, the sender
is requesting the receiver to perform an operation. The receiver then performs theFlight Simulation
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Figure 3.4 Overall CTMS architecture: system components and information flow.37
requested operation by executing a corresponding method, and returns a response to the
sender.
A Smalltalk- class is a unit through which instances and methods can be created.
For the CTMS, an agent was implemented by an instance of a class, and the knowledge
necessary for the agent was implemented in methods of the class. Figure 3.5 shows the
complete list of Smalltalk classes implemented for the CTMS according to their
hierarchical structure.
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Figure 3.5 Complete list of Smalltalk classes in the CTMS. It also
shows the hierarchical structure of the classes.38
The class CockpitTaskManagementSystem is a subclass of Object, the highest-
level class in Smalltalk. For CTMS, CockpitTaskManagementSystem is an executive
class with a unique instance, TheCTMS. Thus, TheCTMS is attributed the role of
CTMS manager placed in charge of the CTMS display, the ultimate CTMS output. The
class Agent is also a subclass of Object, and in this case Agent has two subclasses:
SystemAgent and TaskAgent. These two classes have a number of subclasses through
which system agents and task agents are created. The implementation of system and
task agents for the CTMS is described in the following two subsections.
The CTMS display consisted of three sections: (a) suggested task display
(STD), (b) upcoming task display (UTD), and (c) in-progress task display (ITD).
Tasks which should be started or resumed are shown in the STD, tasks which are the
next to be started are shown in the UTD, and the tasks which have been started are
shown in the ITD. A detailed description of the CTMS display is provided in Appendix
A.
3.2.4System agent (SA)
An SA is a representative of an aircraft subsystem. A subsystem SA receives
state information about its corresponding aircraft subsystem from the flight simulator,
releasing this information when requested. For the CTMS, an SA was implemented by
an instance of a class, and the specific behaviors or knowledge of the SA were
implemented in the methods of the class. For example, the class AirframeAgent has the
instance theAirframe, an SA representing the airframe. One of the methods in the class
AirframeAgent is heading, and theAirframe returns the current heading of the aircraft
when theAirframe receives a request from another agent. Table 3.1 shows a39
comprehensive list of SAs implemented for the CTMS, as well as the aircraft
subsystems represented by SAs and their Smalltalk classes.
Table 3.1 CTMS system agents and their classes.
Aircraft Subsystem Representative Agent Class
airframe theAirframe AirframeAgent
left engine theLeftEngine EngineAgent
right engine theRightEngine EngineAgent
hydraulic system theHYD Hydrauli cSys te mAgent
autopilot theAutopilot Autopi lotA gent
electric power system theECS ECSAgent
extra electric system theEES EESAgent
fuel system theFuelSystem FuelSys temA gent
center fuel tank centerTank FuelTankA gent
mainl fuel tank main 1 Tank FuelTankA gent
main2 fuel tank main2Tank FuelTankA gent
center fuel pump centerPump FuelPumpA gent
mainl fuel pump main]Pump FuelPumpAgent
main2 fuel pump main2Pump FuelPumpAgent
left fuel valve left Va lve FuelValveAgent
right fuel valve rightValve FuelValveAgent
landing gear theGear LandingGearA gent
flap theFlap FlapAgent
electrical input unit theEJU ElUAgent
flight director theFD FDA gent
inertial reference systemtheIRS IRSAgent
navigation computer theNAV Navi gationAgent
3.2.5Task agent (TA)
Task agents are responsible for helping the pilot perform corresponding flight
tasks. Like SAs, TAs were implemented by an instance of a class, and the specific40
behaviors or knowledge necessary for each TA was implemented in the methods of the
class. For example, the class FlySegmentAgent has an instance theFlySegment, a TA
representing the flight task fly_to_a_position. One of the methods in the class
FlySegmentAgent is commandHeading, and theFlySegment returns the command
heading of the aircraft when theFlySegment receives a request from another agent.
Table 3.2 shows the list of TAs implemented for the CTMS, as well as the flight tasks
represented by TAs and their Smalltalk classes.
Table 3.2 CTMS task agents and their classes.
Flight Task Representative Agent Class
climb theClimb ClimbAgent
cruise theCruise CruiseAgent
descent theDescent DescentAgent
approach theApproach ApproachAgent
land theLand LandAgent
fly_to_a_position theFlySegment
climb ToCruiseAltitude
flyToWaypointABC
descentToTouchDown
FlySegmentAgent
maintain_heading theMaintainHeadingManageControlAgent
maintain_altitude theMaintainAltitzide ManageControlAgent
maintain_airspeed theMaintainAirspeedManageControlAgent
maintain_flap theSetFlap ManageControlAgent
manage_contingencyRestoreAutopilot
Restart Engine
MaintainFuelSupply
CorrectHYDFault
Manage ContingecyAgent41
For the CTMS implementation, the state of a TA was either "latent,"
"upcoming," "in-progress," "suggested," or "finished," and TA status was either
"satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory." The state and status of TAs were changed over time
during flights. The task state and status transitions which were caused to occur during
experimental flights are shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, respectively.
The task is not going
to be started soon.
upcoming condition becomes true
The task is going to be
started soon.It is added
to the CTMS display. upcoming
in-progress condition becomes true
The task has
been started.
suggested condition
becomes true
in- progress )4
in-progress condition
becomes true finished condition becomes true
The task is completed.
The task should
be started or
resumed.
Figure 3.6 State transition of a CTMS task agent.
unsatisfactory condition
becomes true
satisfactory condition
becomes true
Figure 3.7 Status transition of a CTMS task agent.42
The general conditions that triggered transitions from one state to another, and
from one status to another, are shown in Table 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. In the sense
intended, prior stands for "timely preceding" as long as the agent and its prior agent are
at the same level in the CTMS hierarchical structure, e.g., theClimb is the prior agent
of theCruise. A special condition isa uniquecontext-specific condition which cannot
be generalized from one type of agent to another (Table 3.5; Table 3.6).
Table 3.3 General state transition trigger conditions.
Condition Tvoe Condition
upcoming condition if its prior agent becomes "in-progress," or
if a special condition becomes true
in-progress condition if its prior agent becomes "finished," or
if one of its subagents becomes "in-progress," or
if a special condition becomes true
suggested condition if it has no superagent, and
if its unsatisfactory condition becomes true
finished condition if its superagent becomes "finished," or
if all of its subagents become "finished," or
if a special condition becomes true
Table 3.4 General status transition trigger conditions.
Condition Tvoe Condition
satisfactory condition if its superagent becomes "satisfactory," or
if all of its subagents become "satisfactory," or
if a special condition becomes satisfied
unsatisfactory conditionif its superagent becomes "unsatisfactory," or
if one of its subagents becomes "unsatisfactory," or
if a special condition becomes satisfied43
Table 3.5 State transition trigger conditions for the CTMS implementation.
flight-phase agent ("latent" initially)
ConditionTVDe Condition
upcoming condition if its prior agent becomes "in-progress"
in-progress conditionif one of its subagents becomes "in-progress"
finished condition if all of its subagents become "finished"
fly-segment agent ("latent" initially)
ConditionTvpe Condition
upcoming condition if a special condition becomes true
(i.e. if its superagent becomes "upcoming")
in-progress conditionif its prior agent becomes "finished"
finished condition if a special condition becomes true
(i.e. if the aircraft arrives at the designated
position)
manage-controlagent ("in-progress" initially)
Condition TVDe Condition
suggested conditionif its unsatisfactory condition becomes true
in-progress conditionif its satisfactory condition becomes true
finished condition if its superagent becomes "finished"
manage - contingencyagent ("suggested" initially)
Condition Tvoe Condition
in-progress conditionif its satisfactory condition becomes true
suggested conditionif its unsatisfactory condition becomes true
finished condition if a special condition becomes true
(i.e. if the system malfunction has been
corrected)44
Table 3.6 Status transition trigger conditions for the CTMS implementation.
flight-phase agent
Condition Tvpe Condition
satisfactory condition if all of its subagents become "satisfactory"
(subagents are fly-segment agents)
unsatisfactory conditionif one of its subagents becomes "unsatisfactory"
fly-segment agent
Condition Tvpe Condition
satisfactory condition if all of its subagents become "satisfactory"
(subagents are manage-control agents and
manage-contingency agents)
unsatisfactory conditionif one of its subagents becomes "unsatisfactory"
manage-control agent
Condition Tvpe Condition
satisfactory condition if a special condition becomes true
(i.e. if the control parameter is within the
appropriate range, or
if the parameter is being controlled toward
the correct direction)
unsatisfactory conditionif a special condition becomes true
(i.e. if the control parameter is out of the
appropriate range, and
if the parameter is not being controlled
toward the correct direction)
manage-contingencv agent
Condition Tvpe Condition
satisfactory condition if a special condition becomes true
(i.e. if the pilot has responded to the system
malfunction correctly)
unsatisfactory conditionif a special condition becomes true
(i.e. if the pilot has not responded to the system
malfunction, or
if the pilot has responded to the system
malfunction incorrectly)45
For the CTMS, three levels of TAs were used: (a) flight-phase agents, (b) fly-
segment agents, and (c) manage-control/contingency agents. A flight-phase agent is a
representative of a flight phase such as climb or cruise. A fly-segment agent represents
a segment flight task such as fly_to _waypoint _ABC or descent_to _touchdown. At the
third and final level, two types of agents were used: manage-control agents and
manage-contingency agents. A manage-control agent represents a control task such as
maintain_altitude or set_flap, and a manage-contingency agent represents a task to
correct a system malfunction such as correct _autopilot fault or
in_flight_engine_restart. A flight-phase agent has a collection of fly-segment agents
as subagents, and a fly-segment task has a collection of manage-control tasks as
subagents. For example, subagents of the land agent included two fly-segment agents,
descentToDecisionHeight and descentToTouchdown; and subagents of each fly-
segment agent included four manage-control agents, theMaintainHeading,
theMaintainAltitude, theMaintainAirspeed, and theSetFlap (Table 3.7).
The four manage-control agents were created when a fly-segment agent became
"in-progress." Initially, the states of the manage-control agents were "in-progress,"
and were "finished" when their superagent, a fly-segment agent, became "finished." A
manage-contingency agent was created when a system malfunction occurred. The state
of a manage-contingency agent was initially "suggested," following which it became
"in-progress" once the pilot responded to the corresponding system malfunction
correctly, and became "finished" when the system malfunction was corrected. Once
created, a manage-contingency agent was treated as if it were a subagent of the "in-
progress" fly-segment agent. The state transition and status transition trigger46
conditions used in the implementation of the CTMS are shown in Table 3.5 and 3.6,
respectively.
Table 3.7 Illustration of three levels of task agents and their classes.
Agent Name Agent Type Agent Class
theClimb
ascent ToCruiseAltitude
theMaintainHeading
theMaintainAltitude
theMaintainAirspeed
theSetFlap
the Cruise
flyToWaypointABC
theMaintainHeading
theMaintainAltitude
theMaintainAirspeed
theSetFlap
CorrectEESFault
RestartEngine
flyToWaypointCBS
theMaintainHeading
theMaintainAltitude
theMaintainAirspeed
theSetFlap
EngageAutopi lot
flight-phase agent
fly-segment agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
flight-phase agent
fly-segment agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-contingency agent
manage-contingency agent
fly-segment agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-contingency agent
ClimbAgent
FlySegmentAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
CruiseAgent
FlySegmentAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
AlanageContingencyAgent
ManageContingencyAgent
FlySegmentAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageContingencyAgent
theLand
descent ToDecisionHeight
theMaintainHeading
theMaintainAltitude
theMaintainAirspeed
theSetFlap
descent To Touchdown
theMaintainHeading
theMaintainAltitude
theMaintainAirspeed
theSetFlap
flight-phase agent
fly-segment agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
fly-segment agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
manage-control agent
LandAgent
FlySegmentAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
FlySegmentAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent
ManageControlAgent47
In the Smalltalk programming language, the characteristics of an object are
determined by the instance variables of the object. For the CTMS, the conditions that
triggered the transition from one state to another or from one status to another, were
contained in the instance variables of a TA. The TA transition conditions were
constantly checked and once one of them was satisfied, the corresponding transition
then proceeded.
In addition to the state and status transitions, there were manage-control agent
transitions between the "hidden" and "shown" modes. When the mode was "hidden,"
the CTMS did not display task information. The mode transitions of manage-control
agents are shown in Figure 3.8, and the conditions that triggered mode transitions are
described in Table 3.8.
unsatisfactory condition
satisfactory condition becomes true
becomes true
hidden s.
Figure 3.8 Mode transition of a manage-control agent.
Table 3.8 Mode transition trigger conditions for a manage-control agent.
Condition Tvoe Condition
hidden
condition
if the control parameter is within the appropriate
range
shown conditionotherwise48
3.2.6CTMS operations
As developed, the CTMS consisted of a collection of SAs and TAs which
interacted each other to facilitate the CTM activities of the pilot, whereas each
represented, respectively, aircraft subsystems and flight tasks. The SAs received
aircraft subsystem information from the flight simulator, providing constant updates of
SA parameters throughout each experimental flight. The SAs returned parameter
values when a request was received from another agent. For example, the landing gear
agent, theGear, received position information "up" or "down"from the flight
simulation, and returned the current gear position when the land agent, theLand, sent a
request message to theGear.
TA states were updated according to events which occurred in the flight
simulator. As described in the previous section, TAs maintained the state/status
transition conditions in their instance variables. That is, when a transition condition
became satisfied during a flight, the corresponding transition occurred. For example, if
finishedCondition, an instance variable of the task agent flyToWaypointABC, contained
the value "the aircraft arrives at waypoint ABC," then as soon as the simulated aircraft
arrived at the waypoint "ABC," the finishedCondition became satisfied and the state of
flyToWaypointABC changed from "in-progress" to "finished."
When a simulated system malfunction occurred, the flight simulator sent the
malfunction information to the corresponding SA in the CTMS. A TA representing the
contingency management was then immediately created as an instance of the class
ManageContingencyAgent. Similar to the operational patterns for other TAs, manage-
contingency agents also maintained the transition conditions in their instance variables.49
When a transition condition became satisfied, the state or status was changed
accordingly. For example, if the left engine was shut down accidentally during a flight,
the information was sent to the task agent theLeftEngine, an instance of the class
EngineAgent. As soon as theLeftEngine received the malfunction information, the task
agent Restart Engine was created. Once the pilot correctly responded to the engine
fault, the inProgressCondition and satisfactoryCondition for the TA became true and
the state and status of RestartEngine were changed, respectively, from "suggested" and
"unsatisfactory" to "in-progress" and "satisfactory." When the pilot successfully
completed the task, the finishedCondition became true and the state was changed from
"in-progress" to "finished."
The core unit of the CTMS was the pilot display, providing information about
all tasks with respect to the following four characteristics: (a) state, (b) status,
(c) priority, and (d) relationship to other tasks. The state of a task was either "latent,"
"upcoming," "in-progress," "suggested," or "finished" (Figure 3.6). Though the CTMS
maintained the states for all tasks, only the information about "upcoming," in-
progress," and "suggested" tasks were presented in the CTMS display. The display
consisted of three sections:(a) UTD (upcoming task display), (b) ITD (in-progress
task display), and (c) STD (suggested task display), with task information provided on
the corresponding display sections. That is, task state information was presented using
location coding. Task status was either "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory" and
indicated by the use of color coding. That is, if a task was "satisfactory," a green
color was used; if it was "unsatisfactory," a yellow or red color was used, depending
upon the seriousness of the task. Task priorities of 3 or lower were not considered50
serious and a yellow color was used; priorities of 4 or higher were considered serious
and a red color was used.
In addition to task state and status, task priority information was presented on
the STD. That is, names of the "suggested" tasks were displayed according to the
priority of the tasks, with higher priority tasks being placed higher in the list. Using
theUTDorITD,the "upcoming" and "in-progress" tasks, respectively, were displayed
in hierarchical structure. Figure 3.9 shows a snapshot of the CTMS display.
SUGGESTED
Restart Engine
Maintain Heading
Engage Autopilot
UPCOMING IN-PROGRESS
Descent
Descent to ABC
Descent to CBS
Cruise
Fly to TOD
Maintain Altitude
Comply with ATC
Figure 3.9 Snapshot of the CTMS display.
3.3Flight Scenarios
Flight scenarios were developed so that the subject pilots could fly the simulator
with uniform sets of flight conditions. The basic elements of a flight scenario included:
(a) scheduled flight path, (b) scheduled altitude profile, (c) simulated events, and51
(d) simulated weather conditions. When a subject flew a scenario, he/she was provided
with a pre-scheduled flight path and an altitude profile for each scenario prior to the
start of the flight (flight paths and altitude profiles are presented in Appendix C).
During a flight, the pilot was asked to respond to the simulated events in the flight
scenario, as described in the following section. However, no subject had prior
awareness of the timing of the events. In addition, to examine simulated weather
conditions, the subject pilot had to turn on the simulator weather radar after the start of
the flight.
Two types of flight scenarios were developed for this project:(a) training
scenarios to accustom subjects to the simulator and (b) data-collection scenarios for the
evaluation of subject performances. Five training scenarios and two data-collection
scenarios were developed and used throughout the experiment. The data-collection
scenarios were "part-mission" flight scenarios, consisting of comprehensive flight tasks
that each of the subject pilots were asked to perform. A part-mission flight scenario
started from the end of climb phase and finished at the end of land phase. While two of
the five training scenarios, similar to the data-collection scenarios, were part-mission
scenarios, the remaining three were designed to train the subjects for such specific
flight tasks as the correction of system faults or performance of approach/land
procedures at the terminal area. The four part-mission flight scenarios used for this
researchtwo for training and two for data-collectingwere named, respectively,
"training scenario A," "training scenario B," "data-collection scenario A," and "data-
collection scenario B." While training scenario A was designed for a 40-minute flight,
the remaining three part-mission scenarios were designed for 50-minute flights.52
3.3.1Simulated events
In each flight scenario, events created flight tasks the subject pilots were asked
to perform. For example, the event engine_shutdown created the flight task
in_flight_restart_engine, and the event ATC_command received created the flight task
comply_with_ATC_command. With respect to the type of triggering conditions, there
were three types of events: (a) time-driven events, (b) condition-driven events, and
(c) a mixture of time-driven and condition-driven types. For example, when the event
engine_shutdown was scheduled to occur at the simulation time 100, it wasa time-
driven event; when the event was scheduled to occur when the aircraft arrived at a
certain position, it was a condition-driven event; and when the event was scheduled to
occur 10 minutes after arrival at a certain position, it was a mixture of time-driven and
condition-driven event.
Events were categorized as one of four types in respect to the type of flight
tasks they created in a scenario: (a) aircraft subsystem malfunctions, (b) aircraft
source selector malfunctions, (c) aircraft control faults, and (d) ATC commands. The
events simulated in this project are listed in Table 3.9.
3.3.2Training scenarios
Training scenarios were used to familiarize the subjects with the flight tasks
they would be asked to perform during the data-collection flights. Five different
training scenarios were developed for this project, including: (a) a scenario to teach53
basic flying skills, (b) a scenario to teach how to respond to simulated events, (c) a
scenario to teach how to perform approach and land procedures,and (d) two part-
Table 3.9 List of simulated events.
Event Cate or Subcate or Event
subsystem faultsautopilot autopilot fault
electric control
system (ECS)
ECS bus fault
ECS bus fault (FA)
ECS-APU2 fault
extra electric
system (EES)
EES temperature high
EES on backup (FA)
engine engine shutdown
EGT high (FA)
engine oil low (FA)
hydraulic
system
left hydraulic system fault
left hydraulic pressure high (FA)
right hydraulic valve fault
fuel system inappropriate fuel supply
unbalanced fuel amount
source selector
faults
electrical input
unit (EIU)
left EIU fault
center EIU fault
right EIU fault
auto EIU fault
EIU on backup
flight director
(FD)
left FD fault
center FD fault
right FD fault
FD on backup
inertial
reference
system (IRS)
left IRS fault
center IRS fault
right IRS fault
left IRS on DC
IRS on backup
navigation
computer (NAV)
left FMC fault
right FMC fault
left CDU fault
right CDU fault
NAV on backup
control faults airspeed inappropriate airspeed
altitude inappropriate altitude
danger of CFIT
heading inappropriate heading
flap inappropriate flap
ATC commandsairspeed command to change airspeed
altitude command to change altitude
<note> FA: false alarm
CFIT: controlled flight into terrain54
mission scenarios to teach the comprehensive flight tasks each subject would be asked
to perform during flights. Subjects were provided with pre-scheduled flight paths and
altitude profiles for each scenario before the start of each flight. With the exception of
the simulated events scenario, flight paths and altitude profiles for the training
scenarios are shown in Appendix C. For the purpose of allowing subjects to
concentrate on the performance of the flight tasks created by the simulated events, the
simulated events scenario was designed with a simple straight-flight path and a cruise-
altitude profile which required no aircraft control.
The training scenario for basic flying was used to teach such basic simulator
flight skills as the maintenance of altitude, airspeed, and heading controls. This
training included how to climb to the cruise altitude and how to cruise from one
waypoint to another. Using this scenario, subjects were also trained in how to avoid
flying into storm areas. The training scenario for simulated events was used to teach
the means of compensation for system malfunctions, how to comply with ATC
commands, how to maintain fuel supply, and how to balance fuel loads. While the
subjects flew this scenario, the experimenter selected events to prompt subject
responses. All of the events simulated in this scenario were previously listed in Table
3.9.
The approach and land procedure scenario, which consisted of complex flight
simulator activities, was used to familiarize subjects with the procedures they would be
expected to perform during approach and land phases. Training of the step-by-step55
procedures for airspeed and flap setting maintenance and changes during the two flight
phases was included in this scenario.
Following the use of the aforementioned training scenarios, each subject flew
two part-mission training scenariostraining scenario A and training scenario B. Each
part-mission scenario was a comprehensive scenario which required the subject pilots to
perform a representative set of abnormal tasks as well as all the regular flight tasks in
the simulator. While training scenario A was designed with a shorter flight path and
fewer flight tasks than training scenario B, the latter was designed to be
comprehensively the equivalent of the two data-collection scenarios described in the
following section.
3.3.3Data-collection scenarios
While the purpose of the training scenarios was to train the subject pilots and to
familiarize them with simulator flight task performance, the purpose of the data-
collection scenarios was to acquire pilot performance data during simulator flights.
Two part-mission flight scenarios were developed for the experiment. In an effort to
remove a potential bias incurred by complexity differences between the two scenarios,
each was designed to present equivalent complexity with respect to aircraft controls and
flight task performance (Appendix D).
Four factors were considered for determination of the complexity of a scenario,
including: (a) total number of waypoints in the flight path, (b) total length of the flight
path, (c) total number of turning angle degrees in the flight path, and (d) total number
of flight tasks from each complexity group. The flight paths in both scenarios56
contained eight waypoints, including departure and arrival waypoints, and the total
lengths of the flight paths were 25.0 and 23.8 miles, respectively. Since the subject
pilots were asked to detour to avoid flying into storm areas, the total lengths of the
rerouted scenario flight paths were also considered and were 25 and 24.8 miles,
respectively, for the two scenarios. Upon arrival at each waypoint, subject pilotswere
required to turn the nose of the aircraft to direct its heading toward the next waypoint.
The total angle of the turns required throughout the scenarioswas also considered with
respect to scenario complexity. The total turning angles in the original flight paths for
both scenarios were, respectively, 268 and 266 degrees, whereas those for the rerouted
paths were 328 and 326 degrees, respectively.
Also, in the effort to design both data-collection scenarios of equivalent degrees
of complexity, the equal number of flight tasks from each complexitygroup was
simulated in both scenarios. First, flight tasks were categorized into fourgroups
according to the number of keystrokes required to perform each task (Table 3.10).
Then, two flight tasks from group 1, two from group 2, 15 fromgroup 3, and three
from group 4 were simulated in each scenario.
3.4Experiment
The previous three sections of this chapter described the following: (a) the
flight simulator used for the experiment, (b) development ofa pilot-vehicle interface,
the CTMS, to be used in conjunction with the flight simulator, and (c) the flight
scenarios providing flight tasks for the subject pilots to perform during simulator57
flights. This section presents a description of the experiment, that is, how it was
prepared, how it was conducted, and how its results were collected and analyzed.
Table 3.10 Four flight task complexity groups.
Group#of Key Strokes Flight Tasks
group 1more than 20 comply_with_ATC_command
group 2more than 10 in_flight_engine_restart
group 33 - 5
.
correct_autopilot_fault
correct_ECS_bus_fault
correct_ECS_bus_fault (FA)
correct ECS APU2_fault
correcLEES_temperature_high
correct_EES_on_backup (FA)
correct_EGT_high (FA)
correct_engine_oil_low (FA)
correct_left_hydraulic_system_fault
correct_left_hydraulic_pressure_high (FA)
correct_right_hydraulic_valve_fault
correct_EIU on_backup
correct FD on backup
correct_left_IRS_on_DC
correct_IRS_on_backup
correct_NAV on_backup
group 41 - 2 correct_left_EIU_fault
correct_center_ElUjault
correct_right_ElUjault
correct_auto_ElUjault
correct_left_FDJault
correct_center_FD_fault
correct_right_FD_fault
correct_left_IRS_fault
correct_center_IRS_fault
correct_right_IRS_fault
correct_left_IRS_on_DC
correct left FMC_fault
correct_right_FMCJault
correct_left_CD U _fault
correct_right_CDU_fault
<note> FA: false alarm58
3.4.1Subjects
Twelve volunteer subjects were used for the experiment. The first four subjects
were used for a pilot study to check the readiness of the experiment, and the remaining
eight subjects were used only for the experimental data collection test runs.
Three factors were considered in choosing subjects: (a) characteristics of the
subject population, (b) recruiting procedure, and (c) number of subjects. First, there
were no major restrictions upon the choice of the subject population, as long as each
subject was able to control the trackballs and the joystick, as well as understand the
documents used for the experiment. Although licensed pilots were preferred, no
volunteers were rejected because they were not licensed pilots. Second, subjects were
recruited using announcements and personal contacts. That is, while subject recruiting
announcements were posted in various places, such as the Oregon State University
Flying Club and Corvallis municipal airport, a number of potential subjects were
personally contacted by the experimenter. Among the 12 subjects, nine subjects were
recruited by personal contact and the remaining three subjects were recruited by means
of the poster announcements.
Determining sample size is one of the most critical aspects of experimental
preparation. In general, confidence in the results of an experiment increases as sample
size increases. However, since sampling takes considerable time and is often a costly
procedure, researchers have sought various means to minimize sample sizes. According
to relevant human factors research, "50 percent of the studies used fewer than 9
subjects per experimental condition, 25 percent used from 9 to 11, and 25 percent used
more than 11" (Sanders & McCormick, 1993, p. 31). Generally, proper sample size59
can be calculated if variance of the measurement in the population can be obtained.
Unfortunately, since the population variance was not available, it was impossible to
determine a proper sample size for this experiment. As a result, it was determined that
eight subjects would first be used for test runs to collect data, then an additional four to
eight subjects would be added if the experimental results from the first eight subjects
indicated the need of a larger sample size. After the initial experiment with eight
subjects, the results showed that the sample size was sufficient for the proposed
experiment.
To comply with the regulations of the US Department of Health and Human
Services with respect to justifying the participation of human subjects in research and
protecting their welfare, rights, and privacy, an experimental plan was submitted to the
Oregon State University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human
Subjects (IRB) (OSU Research Office, 1993). The proposal was thus reviewed and
approved for the use of human subjects prior to the actual conduct of the experiment.
3.4.2Experimental design
A balanced experimental design (Table 3.11) for the data-collection scenario
flights was developed prior to the experimental design for the entire part-mission
scenario flights (Table 3.12). To compare subject performances between flying with
and without the CTMS, each subject flew two data-collection scenariosone with the
CTMS and the other without it.Since each subject had to fly one scenario followed by
the next, it was probable that the performance of the second flight could be affected by
what was learned during the first flight. Therefore, to compensate for a possiblelearning effect, one-half of the eight subjects flew with the CTMS first, followed by
flights without the CTMS, whereas the remaining four subjects reversed this order
(Table 3.11).
Table 3.11 Experimental design for data-collection flights.
Subject Number Run NumberScenario TypeFactors of CTMS
1 1 A with CTMS
2 B without CTMS
2 3 B without CTMS
4 A with CTMS
3 5 A without CTMS
6 B with CTMS
4 7 B with CTMS
8 A without CTMS
5 9 B with CTMS
10 A without CTMS
6 11 A without CTMS
12 B with CTMS
7 13 B without CTMS
14 A with CTMS
8 15 A with CTMS
16 B without CTMS
Table 3.12 Experimental design for entire part-mission flights.
Sub-
ject
ID
First Day Second Day
Training Session Training, Session Data-collecting Session
1st run
Scenar-
io type
2nd run
Scenar-
io type
1st run
Scenar-
io type
2nd run
Scenar-
io type
1st Treatment 2nd Treatment
Treat-
ment #
Scenar-
io type
Treat-
ment #
Scenar-
io type
S49TA - w/TB - w/oTA - w/oTB - w/ T45A - w/ T14B - w/o
S67TA - w/TB - w/oTA w/oTB - w/ T26B - w/o T30A - w/
S97TA - w/TB - w/oTA - w/oTB - w/ T99A - w/o T57B - w/
S15TA - w/TB - w/oTA - w/oTB - w/ T36B - w/ T94A - w/o
S57TA - w/oTB - w/TA - w/TB - w/o T81 B - w/ T31 A - w/o
S98TA - w/oTB - w/TA - w/TB - w/o T58A - w/o T55B - w/
S38TA - w/oTB - w/TA - w/TB - w/oT38 B - w/o T34A - w/
S22TA - w/oTB - w/TA - w/TB - w/oT65A - w/ T72B - w/o
<note>TA : training scenario A
TB : training scenario B
A :data-collection scenario A
B :data-collection scenario B
w/ : with CTMS
w/o : without CTMS
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Two different scenarios, A and B, were developed to remove the learning effect
that would have resulted from the use of an identical scenario in the two data-collection
flights. Each was designed to present the same complexity to minimize the effect by the
differences in scenario complexity, which could prejudiced the results of the
experiment. Nonetheless, to compensate for the effect of the remaining scenario
differences, one-half of the eight subjects flew scenario A first, followed by scenario B,
while the other half of the subjects reversed this order.
Despite these efforts to reduce the learning effect, the design still encompassed a
potential learning effect insofar as the second flight for each subject could have been
affected by what was learned during the first flight. Thus, experimental training
sessions were extended in length to provide sufficient familiarization with the flight
simulator. This step was intended to reduce subject learning during data collection to
acceptable levels. In the conduct of the experiment, each subject was trained in the use
of the flight simulator for a total of six hours over two consecutive days, four hours the
first day and two hours the second day. There were two reasons for the two
consecutive-day design. First, if training and data-collecting sessions were performed
over eight hours in a single day, the experimental results could have been affected by
subject fatigue. Second, if more time had elapsed between sessions, then subjects
would have failed to recall some of what had been learned during the first training
session.
For the final two hours of the first-day and the first two hours of the second-day
training sessions, subjects flew two part-mission training scenarios: training scenario A
and training scenario B. For these flights, subjects always flew training scenario A
followed by training scenario B. However, a pattern of alteration identical to that for62
the data-collection flights was applied in employing the CTMS. That is, one-half of the
subjects flew with the CTMS first, followed by flights without the CTMS, and this
order was reversed for the remaining four subjects.
To provide for the anonymity of the subjects and the confidentiality of the
collected data, any information that was relevant to personal identity was not recorded.
Rather, randomly generated identification numbers were assigned to the subjects and to
the treatments, as shown in Table 3.12.
3.4.3Experimental procedure
The experiment performed for this research consisted of the following elements:
(a) the experimenter, (b) a flight simulator in which flight scenarios were embedded,
(c) recruitment of eight volunteer subjects, (d) a video camera to record the HUD
information during flights, (e) connection of a television set to the video camera for the
purpose of monitoring HUD during the flights as well as to evaluate pilot performance
after the flights, (f) provision of an experiment conduct packet for utilization by the
experimenter, (g) provision of a subject information packet, and (h) provision and/or
use of miscellaneous supplementary experimental materials.
The experiment conduct packet included the documents necessary to the conduct
of the research by the experimenter (Table 3.13). The documents in the information
packet were provided for subject reference during scenario flights (Table 3.14). These
documents were also used in training sessions to familiarize the subjects with the
simulator features and operating procedures. The miscellaneous materials included:
(a) a mnemonic pad in which three basic tips to subjects to obtain improved63
performances were listed (Appendix E), and (b) signs notifying those persons adjacent
to the experimental site that an experiment was in progress. The mnemonic pad was a
memory aid which gave the subjects three simple strategies to obtain betterperformance
scores in flying scenario flights. The signs were an effort to prevent subjectdistraction
due to outside noises.
Table 3.13 List of documents in experiment conduct packet.
Document Name Description
Informed Consent
Document
A stated agreement of participation in the experiment obtained from a
subject candidate prior to the involvement of the subject.It was a
requirement of the OSU Institutional Review Board (IRB) (Appendix
F).
Subject Training
Procedure
A step-by-step procedure to train a subject through the entire
experiment. It had two purposes: (a) keeping the experimenter from
omitting some items in the procedure and (b) providing consistent
training from subject to subject (Appendix G).
Aircraft Subystem
Fault Cases
A description of subsystem malfunctions simulated in the flight
scenarios.It was used to teach subjects how to compensate for
subsystem malfunctions (Appendix H).
Quiz After the pilot study using four subjects, it was found that some of the
important materials covered during the first two-hour training session
were easily forgotten by the subjects. This quiz was designed to
emphasize that the subjects should memorize those important
materials. In a sense, it played the role of a simple rehearsal
(Appendix I).
Questionnaire The subject was asked to answer this questionnaire after the
experiment was completed. The questionnaire was used to obtain
subsidiary information concerning the experiment (Appendix J).
The experimental procedure was administered in two lengthy sessions: a
training session and a data-collecting session. After a four-hour first-day training
session followed by a two-hour second-day training session, each subject flew two 50-
minute data-collection flight scenarios with a 5 to 10 minute break between flights.Table 3.14 List of documents in information packet.
Document Name Description
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Basic Controls
and Displays
A detailed description about the controls and displays of the simulator
(Appendix A).
Flight ManualA description of how to perform the flight tasks simulated in the flight
scenarios (Appendix B).
Priority TableA complete priority list for all of the flight tasks simulated in the
scenarios. Although the subjects were asked to memorize the priority
list, it was provided for the subjects reference during a part-mission
scenario flight without the CTMS (Appendix K).
Flight Path A map of a scenario, which shows: (a) the pre-planned flight paths the
subject should fly through and (b) the waypoints located in the flight
path and the waypoints around it (Appendix C).
Altitude
Profile
A map of a scenario, which includes:(a) the pre-planned altitude
trajectory the aircraft should follow and (b) the pre-planned airspeeds
the aircraft should comply with. As a mnemonic aid to set upproper
heading, altitude, airspeed, and flaps, two kinds of information are
provided in an altitude profile:(a) relationship table among percent
throttle, airspeed, and flap angle and (b) allowance limits of heading,
altitude, and airspeed for the entire flight phases (Appendix C).
Checklist Operating procedures for non-trivial flight tasks simulated for this
experiment.It is divided into two sections: normal checklist and
emergency/abnormal checklist. The subjects were asked to use itas a
mnemonic aid for complex operating procedures, as well as a tool to
verify that systems were correctly configured and that operating actions
were properly performed for a specific task or a flight segment
(Appendix L).
Upon arrival at the experimental site, the subject candidatewas asked to read
the informed consent document, and then to sign it if he/shewas willing to participate
in the experiment. Then, the first-day training session proceeded in accordance with the
Subject Training Procedure, as outlined in Appendix G. First,two documents, Basic
Controls and Displays (Appendix A) and Flight Manual (Appendix B)were used to
explain the basic simulator features and operation procedures. The subjectwas then
asked to fly the first three training scenarios, including basic flying, correctingsystem
malfunctions, and approach/land. During these flights, the subjectwas allowed to ask
questions at any time.65
The subject was always provided with five written documents in the information
packet during both training and data-collection scenario flights, including: Basic
Controls and Displays, Flight Manual, Flight Path, Altitude Profile, and Checklist.
An additional document, Priority Table, was provided when the subject flew without
the CTMS, but was not provided for flights using the CTMS.
After the subject completed the first three training scenario flights, important
features previously covered were rehearsed. The Priority Table was then given to the
subject to memorize the task priorities with which he/she would be asked to comply
during simulator flights. After memorizing the flight task priorities, a quiz was
administered to rehearse some of the most important features covered in the training
sessions. During the quiz, the subject was encouraged to ask the experimenter
questions. After the results of the quiz were reviewed, the subject flew the first part-
mission training scenario, training scenario A, followed by the second part-mission
training scenario, training scenario B.It took approximately 40 minutes to fly training
scenario A and 50 minutes to fly training scenario B. In accordance with the previously
described experimental design, the subject flew one scenario with the CTMS and the
other without it (Table 3.12), with a 5 to 10 minute break between the two flights.
During these two flights, the experimenter helped the subject recall the correct
operating procedures. However, the subject was not allowed to ask the experimenter
any questions. Rather, he/she was encouraged to refer to the provided information
packet since that was what he/she would be required to do during the data-collecting
session on the second day.
The second-day experiment consisted of two sessions: a two-hour training
session and a two-hour data-collecting session. The training session started with a66
rehearsal of the overall operating procedures covered in the first-day training session.
Following the rehearsal, the subject flew two part-mission training scenarios: training
scenario A and training scenario B. Just as for the first-day session, the subject was
encouraged to refer to the provided documents in the information packet rather than
posing questions to the experimenter. Following the second training scenario flight, the
subject was asked to fly the two data-collection scenarios with a 5 to 10 minute
intermission between flights. As for the training session part-mission scenario flights,
the scenario types of the data-collection flights were determined in accordance with the
experimental design as previously shown in Table 3.12. The entire data-collection
performance was videotaped for use in the evaluation of subject performance. The
subjects were not allowed to ask any questions during these flights.
Following the second data-collection scenario, the subject was asked to complete
a questionnaire regarding the experiment (Appendix J). The questionnaire was used to
obtain subsidiary information about the experiment.
3.4.4Performance measurements
Four measurements were considered for the evaluation of the subject
performance in the flight simulator: (a) task prioritization, (b) pilot response time,
(c) aircraft controls, and (d) task completion. Three of the four measurements, task
prioritization, pilot response time, and task completion, reflected the three elements in
the Madhavan's (1993) CTM error taxonomy: task prioritization, task initiation, and
task termination, respectively (Table 2.3). Subject performances in the use of aircraft67
controls, including heading, altitude, and airspeed controls, were measured because they
were essential to the comprehensive measurement of overall pilot performance.
To evaluate how correctly a subject prioritized multiple, concurrent tasks, the
ratio of misprioritizations to opportunities for misprioritization was calculated and
used. For example, subject S49 committed seven misprioritizations out of 24
opportunities in his T45 treatment (Appendix M). As a result, the subject's task
prioritization score for this treatment was 29.17%.
In turn, pilot response time was a measurement of how quickly each subject
responded to a flight task whose progress was not satisfactory. According to CTM
theory (section 3.2.5), each flight task was assigned the status "satisfactory"or
"unsatisfactory." The pilot response time measured in this experiment was obtained
from the time elapsed from when the task became "unsatisfactory" to the time the
subject pilot first responded to the task.
Each scenario flight followed a pre-planned flight schedule. The subject pilot
was expected to follow a specific flight path with pre-scheduled altitudes and airspeeds.
How well the subject complied with the pre-planned flight schedule constituted the third
performance measurement.
At times, one or more flight tasks were not completed by the time a scenario
flight ended. In general, this occurred because the subject forgot to completea task, or
even forgot to start a task; it also sometimes occurred because the pilot did not have
sufficient time to start or complete the task. The total number of incomplete taskswas
tallied to measure subject performance.
Pilot performance from the 16 scenario flights flown by eight subjectswas
collected for these four performance measurements. The simulator log files, which68
recorded pilot actions and performances, as well as videotapes were used to collect
performance data. The means of data collection and evaluation are described in the
following section.
3.4.5Data collection
For this experiment, three levels of tasks were used. The task levels included
flight-phase tasks, fly-segment tasks, and manage-control/contingency tasks. For
example, cruise was a flight-phase task and fly_to_waypoint_ABC wasa fly-segment
task. At the lowest level, manage-control tasks included maintain_altitudeor set_flap,
and the manage contingency tasks included correct_azitopilot_fault or
comply_with_ATC_command. Only the performances for manage-control/contingency
tasks, at the lowest level, were collected and analyzed for the experiment since the
lowest level tasks were the only tasks directly controlled by the subject pilots.
Performance of the two higher level task types was reflected in lowest level task
performance.
Among the four flight simulator computers, CTMS, navigation, and subsystem
computers recorded data in log files providing information about subject actions and
task progressiveness. The log files of the navigation and subsystem computers stored
information about such subject actions as simulation times when the actionswere taken
and description of the actions, whereas the CTMS computer log files recorded
information about flight tasks, including:(a) time that the tasks were completed,
(b) name of the tasks, (c) identification number of the tasks, (d) task priorities, and
(e) time elapsed from when the tasks became "unsatisfactory" to the time the tasks69
became "satisfactory" (Figure 3.10). The HUD image was videotaped to record the
sidestick movement which controlled the aircraft altitude and heading.
Data on the four performance measurements described in the previous section,
including task prioritization, pilot response time, aircraft controls, and task completion,
were collected using the log files and recorded videotapes.
CTMS computer
0Trace in CTMS computer
0Treatment: scenario A
0Apr 7, 199415:14:45
0
114 <EGT high> 10 5 24
134 <Left HYD press high> 14 4 54
156<FD on backup> 13 2 6
178 <Right HYD valve> 16 3 19
199 < Maintain altitude> 27 3 178
280 <Maintain airspeed> - INCOMPLETE
341 <Maintain airspeed> 26 3 35
Navigation computer
0Trace in navigation computer
0Treatment: scenario A
0Apr 7, 199415:11:21
0
10 <Type II knob> MAP, ()
12 <Type II knob> MAP, ()
69 <Push button> [ATC button (REQ)] is pushed
112 <Type III knob> PLN, (WXR POS DATA)
202 [Request to ATC] "Request to add EAR after FOX"
208[ATC reply] "Request permitted."
Subsystem computer
0Trace in subsystem computer
0Treatment: scenario A
0Apr 7, 1994 15:08:22
0
80 {Case 1 (hydraulic system: Left HYD press alert)} activated
84 Aux EICAS> DisplayFormatFuelSystem => [hydraulics]
86 [CDU] Top page [show:] (5 - subsystem) => Subsystems page
Figure 3.10 Typical log files.70
Collecting performance data for task prioritization
First, subject task prioritization performance was obtained from the ratio of
misprioritizations to opportunities for misprioritization during scenario flights. To
count the number of opportunities for misprioritization and the number of
misprioritizations committed during a flight systematically, consistently, and with little
effort, a simple computer program was developed to generate a graphic chart called the
task activity chart.The computer program used CTMS log files as input, generating
task activity charts as output. Each horizontal line in the chart indicated the activities
involved in completing a flight task. From Figure 3.11, the starting point of a line
indicates when the task became "unsatisfactory," and the ending point indicates when
the subject pilot took the final action to complete the task. Note that the ending point
may not be the time the task became "finished" since for this experiment some of the
tasks took from 5 to 10 seconds for the last required action to be effective. That is,
while some tasks were "finished" as soon as the subject took the last action, some were
"finished" only from 5 to 10 seconds after the subject had taken the last action. Each
of the numbers located at the line ends indicates the simulation times of the starting and
ending points in seconds. In Figure 3.11, the first task became "unsatisfactory" at time
40, and the subject took the last action to complete the task at time 260. The number
above each line indicates the identification number of the task, and the number below
each line indicates the task priority. For example, from Figure 3.11, the identification
number of the first task was 27, and it was given a priority of 3.71
<27> <28> 40 260340 [3] [3]
50
<14>
[3]
90
<10>
[5] 240
300390
<1>
[1]
500
<13>
405[2]
505
550
0
Time
600
Figure 3.11 Illustration of a task activity chart. The number above
a line indicates the task identification number, and the
number in square brackets indicates the task priority.
In general, a task is called active when it is "in-progress" or "unsatisfactory."
In this project, however, a task is called active when it is "in-progress" or
"unsatisfactory" and the pilot has not completed all of the required actions to perform
the task, whether or not the task has been initiated. Thus, when a task becomes
"unsatisfactory," it becomes an active task with "suggested" state and "unsatisfactory"
status. Each line in the task activity chart indicates the duration when the task was
active. According to the flight scenario setups for this research, some tasks became
"satisfactory" with the state "in-progress" as soon as the subject pilot initiated the
tasks; and some tasks became so only when the pilot finished all of the required actions
to complete the tasks. In general, opportunities for misprioritization could be found
where there were multiple, concurrent active tasks for the pilot to perform. When a
task became active, the number of opportunities for misprioritization was obtained from
the number of other concurrent active tasks whose priorities were different than the first
active task. For example, when a priority-2 task became active while there were six
concurrent active tasks, including one priority-I, two priority-2, and three priority-372
tasks, there were four opportunities for misprioritization. Figure 3.12 illustrates how
to count the number of opportunities for misprioritization.
o : Opportunity for misprioritization
<27>
[3]
<5>
[4]
<10>
[5]
<25> o
<2>
a
<26>
[3]
<1> 0[1]
<7>
[4]
<27>
[3]
[4]
0
Time -
600
Figure 3.12 Illustration of determination of the number of opportunities
for misprioritization using a task activity chart. Sixteen
opportunities for misprioritization are observed in this chart.
In this experiment, where there was an opportunity for misprioritization there
were two active tasks involved: a task that just became active and a task which was
already active. For example, from Figure 3.12, the first opportunity for
misprioritization occurred between task #27 and 410, wherein task 410 just became
active and task #27 was already active. To determine whether or not a misprioritization
was committed, only the times the pilot took the last actions to complete the two tasks
were considered. When the pilot completed all the required actions for the lower
priority task before the higher priority task, it was considered that the pilot committeda
misprioritization. To the contrary, when the pilot completed the required actions for the73
higher priority task first, it was considered a correct prioritization. Because of the
potential complexity in detecting all the misprioritizations involved in performing a
task, misprioritized actions committed before the final action to perform a task were
ignored in counting the number of misprioritizations. Figure 3.13 illustrates how to
count the number of misprioritizations using a task activity chart.
a: Opportunity for misprioritization
x : Commitment of misprioritization
x x <27> <26>
[3]
<1n>
00
x
[3]
x<1>
Oo
[5]
<5>
bX
[1]
x<7>
[4]
X <25>
o
[4]
<27>
[3]
<2> Ox
[3]
0
[4]
0Time *
600
Figure 3.13 Illustration of determination of the number of misprioritizations
using a task activity chart. The number in square brackets
indicates the task prioritythe larger the number, the higher the
priority. Eleven misprioritizations, of 16 opportunities were
observed, providing a 68.75% of task prioritization score.
Collecting performance data for pilot response time
Pilot response time is the time elapsed from when a task became active to the
time the pilot took the first action to perform the task. The time a task became active
and the time the task was initiated were obtained using the log files from the three74
computersCTMS, navigation, and subsystem computersas well as the videotapes of
the HUD display. For example, according to the fifth line in the subsystem log file
shown in Figure 3.10, a hydraulic system fault occurred at time 80; that is,a
correctjeft_hydraulic_systemjault task became active at simulation time 80. This
information about the task activation time is confirmed by the sixth line of the CTMS
log file shown in Figure 3.10. That is, the number 134 at the beginning of the line
indicates the simulation time at which the task became "satisfactory." The number 54
at the end of the line indicates that it took 54 seconds for the task to become
"satisfactory" after it had become "unsatisfactory" and active. By subtracting 54 from
134, the time the task became active is confirmed to be 80. The sixth line in the
subsystem log file shows that the pilot brought up the hydraulic synoptic display at time
84, which is the first action taken to perform the correct jeft_hydraulic_systemjault
task. Therefore, the pilot response time for the correct jeft_h.ydraulic_systemjault
task was four seconds.
Collecting performance data for aircraft control
Aircraft control parameters included altitude, airspeed, and heading. Duringa
simulator flight, the subject pilot was asked to follow the command values of the
control parameters as displayed on the HUD. As shown in Table 3.15, certain
deviations from the command values were permitted. For example,as long as the
difference between the command heading and the current headingwas less than five
degrees throughout the flight, the heading was considered to be correctly controlled.75
Table 3.15 Allowance limits for aircraft control parameters.
Climb Cruise DescentApproach Land
Heading
50 50 50 50 50
Altitude 500 ft 1,000 ft 500 ft 500 ft 100 ft
Airspeed10 knots10 knots10 knots10 knots10 knots
It was considered a correct aircraft control if the current value of the control
parameter was within the allowance limit, or if the control was pointed toward the
correct direction. For example, when the command altitude was 30,000 feet during a
cruise phase, the aircraft was considered to maintain a correct altitude as long as the
altitude remained between 29,000 and 31,000 feet. When the altitude exceeded 31,000
feet, the maintain_altitude task became "unsatisfactory." If the aircraft was flying at
35,000 ft and the pilot recognized that it was too high and started descending, the task
maintain_altitude became "satisfactory" although the current altitude was out of the
allowance limit since the altitude was being controlled toward the correct direction.
Satisfactory and unsatisfactory conditions for the aircraft control parameters are
illustrated in Figure 3.14.
The ratio of the duration that the aircraft controls were "unsatisfactory" to the
total simulation time was used as the third performance measurement (Figure 3.15).
From subject to subject, the total simulation time for a scenario flight was different,
depending on how he/she flew the scenario. To obtain fair and consistent measurements
of the aircraft control performance, the same ending condition of the simulator flights
was applied to each scenario and to each subject pilot. That is, a scenario flight was
considered to be completed as soon as the aircraft was fully configured for landing.76
upper allowance limit
commanded value
lower allowance limit
satisfactory unsatisfactory .4 satisfactory
aircraft control parameter
time 10
Figure 3.14 Satisfactory and unsatisfactory conditions for an
aircraft control parameter.
upper allowance limit
command value
lower allowance limit
satisfactory .4 unsatisfactory .4-- satisfactory
an aircraft control parameter
0 250
time
580 1,000
Figure 3.15 Measuring the ratio of unsatisfactory aircraft control
throughout a scenario flight. Assuming a total simulation
time of 1,000 seconds, the ratio is (580 - 250)/1,000, or
33%.
For an aircraft to be fully configured for landing, the following conditions had to be
satisfied:(a) the three aircraft control tasks should be "satisfactory," (b) the flap angle
should be set to 25 degrees, or full flaps, and (c) the landing gear should be down and77
locked. That is, the total simulation time for each flight scenario was obtained from the
time the aircraft was fully configured for landing. After collecting the subject
performance for the three control parameters, airspeed, altitude, and heading, the
results were averaged to obtain the overall aircraft control performance (Table 3.16).
Table 3.16 Example for calculating overall performance of the aircraft
controls in a scenario flight.
(1) duration of unsatisfactory airspeed 330 seconds
(2) duration of unsatisfactory altitude 570 seconds
(3) duration of unsatisfactory heading 240 seconds
(4) = ( (1) + (2) + (3) ) / 3 380.0 seconds
(5) total simulation time 1,000 seconds
(6) = (4) / (5) * 100 38%
Collecting performance data for task completion
Throughout a simulator flight, some tasks were not completed for a number of
reasons, including the following: (a) the pilot did not start the task because he/she
didn't recognize that the task became active, (b) the pilot did not start the task because
he/she was busy with other concurrent tasks, (c) the pilot started the task, but did not
finish it because he/she forgot the correct procedure, (d) the pilot started the task, but
did not finish it because he/she was distracted, or (e) the pilot started the task, but did
not finish the task because he/she was busy with other concurrent tasks. The number of
incomplete tasks throughout a scenario flight were counted and used as the fourth and
the last performance measurement.78
While some flight tasks, e.g., in_flight_engine_restart or balance fuel, were
not subject to time constraints for completion; other flight tasks, e.g.,
maintain_altitude or comply_with_ATC_command, were required to be completed by a
certain time. For example, when an aircraft control task such as maintain_altitude or
maintain_airspeed became "unsatisfactory" and was not completed by the time the
aircraft reached the waypoint to which the aircraft was flying, the aircraft control task
was considered to be incomplete. This was because the command values of the aircraft
control parameters may have changed upon arrival at a waypoint. There were two
kinds of ATC commands simulated for this experiment: reset_command_altitude and
reset_command_airspeed. Their associated flight tasks were
comply_with_ATC_command_for_altitude and
comply_with_ATC_command_for_airspeed. Like all aircraft control tasks, unless the
pilot finished these flight tasks prior to the aircraft arrival at the "flying-to" waypoint,
the tasks were considered to be incomplete.79
4. RESULTS
This chapter presents: (a) the results of the experiment, (b) the analysis of the
results, (c) a supplementary analysis of the results, and (d) an interpretation of the
results. The results of the experiment provided in the first section are based upon
subject performance data obtained from the data-collecting sessions. The second
section provides a description of how the aggregated results were analyzed with respect
to the evaluation of CTMS effectiveness. The third section presents findings from a
secondary analysis of results to provide supplementary information about the
experimental results. The final section of this chapter includes an interpretation of the
experimental findings.
4.1Experimental Results
In the data-collecting sessions, each of the eight subjects flew two part-mission
flight scenariosone with and one without the CTMS. Subject flight performances
were recorded on log files in the simulator computers, and each was videotaped to
provide evaluative data. Four performance measurements were considered: (a) task
prioritization, (b) pilot response time, (c) aircraft controls, and (d) task completion. In
association with these four measures, the data for the following four variables were
collected:(a) the ratio of misprioritizations to opportunities for misprioritization, (b)
time required for subjects to first respond to "unsatisfactory" flight tasks, (c) the
proportion of unsatisfactory aircraft control time during a flight, and (d) the total
number of flight tasks the subjects failed to complete by the end of the flights.80
Following the collection of subject performance data, as described in section
3.4.5, the results were summarized on eight Subject Performance Score Cards
(Appendix M)-one for each of the subject pilots-using Experimental Results
Aggregation Procedure (Appendix N). Data entered on the cards included all
performance results for the eight subjects, or the summary material used for the
analysis of the experimental results. The summary of the experimental results,
organized according to the four performance measurements, is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Summary of the experimental results. Note that the smaller the number,
the better the performance.
Task misprioritizations (%)
Subject
Number
Performance
w/o CTMS
Performance
w/ CTMS
S49 66.67 29.17
S67 0.00 10.26
S97 42.11 25.00
S15 24.00 20.83
S57 28.57 11.77
S98 33.33 0.00
S38 32.00 17.65
S22 25.00 35.00
Unsatisfactory aircraft controls (%)
Subject
Number
Performance
w/o CTMS
Performance
w/ CTMS
S49 3.62 5.11
S67 5.23 3.14
S97 6.21 1.73
S15 6.10 2.90
S57 12.43 6.82
S98 7.53 7.62
S38 7.97 8.73
S22 3.05 3.43
Subject response time (seconds)
Subject
Number
Performance
w/o CTMS
Performance
w/ CTMS
S49 13.84 14.23
S67 9.28 14.04
S97 14.63 8.29
S15 17.95 16.41
S57 24.18 13.65
S98 25.94 17.14
S38 32.07 21.51
S22 9.34 15.39
Number of incomplete tasks
Subject
Number
Performance
w/o CTMS
Performance
w/ CTMS
S49 0 2
S67 3 0
S97 5 0
S15 1 1
S57 4 0
S98 4 1
S38 4 0
S22 1 081
4.2Analysis of Results
4.2.1Comparison of mean subject performance
One of the goals of the present study was to determine if the CTMS provided
effective flight-task assistance during simulated flights. To arrive at this determination,
mean subject performances flying with and without the CTMS were compared. As
shown in Figure 4.1, when subjects flew with the assistance of the CTMS, the mean
task misprioritization rate was reduced by 41%, the mean subject response time was
reduced by 18%, the exercise of mean unsatisfactory aircraft controls was reduced by
24%, and the average number of incomplete tasks during simulator flights was reduced
by 82%.
31.46
El : w/o CTMS
: w/ CTMS
18.71
18.40
15.08
6.52 2.75
0.50
ve-
Misprioritizations
(%)
improved by 41%
Response time Unsatisfactory controls
(seconds) (%)
improved by 18% improved by 24%
Incomplete tasks
improved by 82%
Figure 4.1 Comparison of mean subject performance for flights with and
without CTMS assistance. Note that the shorter the bar, the
better the performance.82
4.2.2Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
In addition to comparing the subject performance averages, a statistical analysis
of the collected data using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed as an
additional means of determining whether use of the CTMS resulted in improved subject
performance. For the ANOVA, subject performance for each measurement was
expressed as:
Yijkm = aibi + Ckdm + eijkm
whereµ was the population mean, i.e., the average subject performance
regardless of which experimental factors were considered;
a, was the treatment effect (i = 0 or 1 for, respectively, conditions without
or with the CTMS);
b was the subject effect (j = 1 to 8 for, respectively, subject pilots 1 to 8);
ck was the scenario effect (k = 1 or 2 for, respectively, scenarios A or B);
dm was the learning effect (m = 0 or 1 for, respectively, the first flight
where the learning effect is absent or the second flight where the
learning effect is present); and
eijkm was the error term, i.e., other unknown or ignored effect.
To construct the experimental design model, four major factors were considered:
the treatment, subject, scenario, and learning effects. The treatment effect, ai, was
determined by whether or not the subject flew with the CTMS. The subject effect, b j,
could affect flight performance according to experience, skill level, and various
characteristics of the subjects. The scenario effect, ck, was determined by the type of
the flight scenario. For example, if one scenario was more difficult than the other, it
was possible that subject performance would be affected by differences in scenario
complexity notwithstanding efforts made to design two data-collecting scenarios of
equivalent degrees of complexity. The learning effect, dm, was determined by whether
the flight was the first or the second in the data-collecting session. Though steps were
taken to mitigate the learning effect, a possibility that subject performance in the83
second flight could have been affected by what was learned in the first flight remained a
factor in the conduct of the experiment. To perform the ANOVA, it was necessary to
assume that the Y values for all i, j, k, and m, have normal distributions with equal
variances.
Since the hypothesis test using the ANOVA was based upon the expectation that
performances with the CTMS would be better than performances without the CTMS, a
one-tailed test was employed. A type I error, denoted by a, for both 0.1 and 0.05, was
used insofar as this form has gained acceptance for use in typical statistical analyses.
The results of a hypothesis test is reported as a number called the "p-value"a
measurement of the credibility of the hypothesis test. A type I error, a, and a p-value
are used to determine whether the null hypothesis, denoted by Ho, could be rejected.
For this research, the p-values from the ANOVA for the four performance
measurements were obtained using the STATGRAPHICS (version 7.0) statistics
computer software package. Since the principal concern of the experiment was CTMS
effectiveness, as indicated by the p-values for the treatment effect, only these values are
presented in this section. Discussion of the p-values for the remaining three effects are
provided in the following section. Table 4.2 shows the results of the ANOVA for the
treatment effect.
Table 4.2 ANOVA p-values for treatment effect and hypothesis test results for
a = 0.1 and a = 0.05 (Ho: 1.10 = Ha: 1.10 > 1-11)
Performance Measure-value Test Result, a=0.1 Test Result, a=0.05
Misprioritization 0.066Reject Ho since p < aDo not reject Ho since p > a
Response time 0.093Reject Ho since p < aDo not reject Ho since p > a
Aircraft controls 0.052Reject Ho since p < aDo not reject Ho since p > a
Incomplete tasks 0.009Reject Ho since p < a Reject Ho since p < a84
From the results of the hypothesis test, the p-value for incomplete tasks
indicated that there was a significant improvement for task completion performance
when subjects flew with the assistance of the CTMS, whereas the p-values for the
remaining three measurements for task prioritization, task initiation, and aircraft
controls were "suggestive" with respect to evidence of performance improvement.
4.3Supplementary Analysis of Results
Although the p-value for the treatment effect was the principal interest of this
research, those for the remaining three effectssubject, scenario, and learning
effectsprovided information useful for an understanding of the experimental results.
Similarly, whereas in the previous section the p-values from the ANOVA were analyzed
to measure CTMS effectiveness, results from a "paired-t" hypothesis test were also
used to provide supplementary information valuable to the analysis of the experimental
results. The results for the ANOVA of the three effects as well as the paired-t test
results are presented in the following two subsections.
4.3.1ANOVA for subject, scenario, and learning effects
In addition to the p-values for treatment effect, the results of the ANOVA also
reported p-values for the subject, scenario, and learning effects. As for the analysis of
the treatment effect, since it was expected that subjects would perform better in the
second data-collection flights if a learning effect existed, a one-tailed hypothesis test
was applied to analyze this effect. To the contrary, since it was not expected that one
subject would outperform another, nor that one data-collection flight scenario would be85
easier to fly than the other, two-tailed tests were applied to analyze the subject and the
scenario effect. Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses for the three effects were
as follows:
Subject effect:
Scenario effect:
Learning effect:
Ho: III = g2 = = 117 =-
Ha: p # la, for some i and j
(i.e., at least two of the means are not equal);
Ho: 1.1.1 = g2, Ha: g1 # p.2; and
Ho: go = la1, Ha: go >
Table 4.3 shows the results of the ANOVA p-values for all effects, including the
subject, scenario, and learning effects as well as the treatment effect. Note that the p-
values for subject effect presented were not important since the goal of the analysis was
to compare intra-subject flight performance between flying with and without the CTMS
in expectation of inter-subject performance variations in the simulator experiment.
However, the subject effect p-values were added to the ANOVA results shown in Table
4.3 to provide subsidiary information from the experiment.
Table 4.3 ANOVA p-values for all effects.
Performance Measure Treatment EffectSubject EffectScenario EffectLearning Effect
Misprioritization 0.066* 0.317 0.532 0.454
Response time 0.093* 0.110* 0.169 0.213
Aircraft controls 0.052* 0.057* 0.082* 0.429
Incomplete tasks 0.009** 0.708 0.302 0.035**
* p-valueindicating marginally significant evidence for the effect
** p-value indicating significant evidence for the effect
From the results of the hypothesis test for a = 0.05, p-values for subject effect
indicated that there was no evidence of significant differences among subjects.
However, the p-value 0.057 for aircraft controls provided a marginal evidence that
some of the subjects were better than others at aircraft control tasks. The p-values for86
some of the subjects were better than others at aircraft control tasks. The p-values for
scenario and learning effects indicated that with the exception of the learning effect for
task completion, there was no significant evidence of performance differences. The p-
value of the learning effect for task completion indicated the existence of a significant
effect. Though exceptions were found to exist, these p-values indicated that the efforts
undertaken to mitigate the scenario and learning effects were generally successful.
4.3.2Paired-t test
In general, a paired-t test provides an appropriate method for analysis of the
means for small-sized samples, permitting comparison of intra-subject performance. To
perform the paired-t test for this project, however, it was necessary to assume that
neither scenario nor learning effects existed for the experimental simulator flights.
Therefore, the use of the paired-t test cannot be validated unless those effects can be
ignored. In this case, theANOVAresults presented in the previous subsection
indicated that there was no significant evidence for either a scenario or learning effect,
in general. Since the p-values for scenario effect were relatively high, the second
ANOVAtest was performed after the scenario factor was dropped from the original
experimental model. Table 4.4 shows the results from the secondANOVA.
Table 4.4ANOVAp-values with the scenario effect neglected.
Performance Measure Treatment EffectSubject EffectScenario EffectLearning Effect
Misprioritization 0.055* 0.259 0.451
Response time 0.111* 0.140 0.235
Aircraft controls 0.084* 0.112* 0.443
Incomplete tasks 0.008** 0.729 0.033**
* p-value indicating marginally significant evidence for the effect87
The p-values for treatment effect shown in Table 4.5 indicate that there was no
significant change from the previous analysis, wherein all of the effects were
considered. Though the increase in p-value for aircraft controls was relatively
noteworthy (from 0.052 to 0.084), it was not considered a large change because of the
small sample size used (eight subjects). Since, with the exception of the task
completion factor, the p-values for the learning effect were generally high, it was
determined that the learning factor in addition to the scenario effect could be ignored
for the third ANOVA (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5 ANOVA p-values with scenario and learning effects neglected.
Performance Measure Treatment EffectSubject EffectScenario EffectLearning Effect
Misprioritization 0.041** 0.187
Response time 0.102* 0.109*
Aircraft controls 0.067* 0.069*
Incomplete tasks 0.016** 0.880
* p-value indicating marginally significant evidence for the effect
** p-value indicating significant evidence for the effect
The results from the hypothesis test using ANOVA for only two
factorstreatment and subjects factorswere equivalent to the results obtained from
the paired-t test.Since the scenario effects for both task prioritization and subject
response time-0.532 and 0.169, respectively (Table 4.3)and the learning
effects-0.451 and 0.235, respectively (Table 4.4)were found to be negligible, the
paired-t test can be validly used to evaluate the CTMS effectiveness for these two
performance measurements. Though the use of the paired-t test cannot be validated for
the remaining two measurements because of the significant p-values of the scenario88
effect for aircraft controls (0.082) and the learning effect for task completion (0.035),
the test nonetheless provided valuable information for an understanding of the
experimental results. The paired-t test procedure employed for each of the performance
measurements is described as follows:
1. List subject performances without the CTMS (treatment 1, Table 4.6).
2. List subject performances with the CTMS (treatment 2); note that the smaller
the number, the better the performance.
3. Calculate the difference between the two sets of performance results
(difference = p.); note that a positive difference indicates a better
performance with the CTMS.
4. Perform a paired-t test under the null hypothesis of p. = 0; a one-tailed test
with a type I error a = 0.05 was employed.
To perform the paired-t test, it was necessary to assume that the differences
between the two sets of treatment values had normal distributions. The results of the
paired-t test are shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Results of paired-t test for a = 0.05 (Ho: p. = 0; Ha: p. > 0).
Task misprioritizations (%) <NOTE> treatment 1: without CTMS
treatment 2: with CTMS
treatment 1treatment 2difference.1. (treatment 1- treatment 2)
66.67 29.17 37.50
0.00 10.26 -10.26
42.11 25.00 17.11
24.00 20.83 3.17
28.57 11.77 1 6. 80
33.33 0.00 33.33
32.00 17.65 14.35
25.00 35.00 -10.00
p-value = 0.041 Since a > p-value, reject Ho89
Table 4.6 (Continued)
Subject response time (seconds)
treatment 1treatment 2difference i..t (treatment 1 - treatment 2)
13.84 14.23 -0.39
9.28 14.04 -4.76
14.63 8.29 6.34
17.95 16.41 1.54
24.18 13.65 10.53
25.94 17.14 8.80
32.07 21.51 10.56
9.34 15.39 -6.05
p-value = 0.102 Since a < p-value, do not reject Ho.
Unsatisfactory aircraft controls (%)
treatment 1treatment 2difference i.i (treatment 1 - treatment 2)
3.62 5.11 -1.49
5.23 3.14 2.09
6.21 1.73 4.48
6.10 2.90 3.20
12.43 6.82 5.61
7.53 7.62 -0.09
7.97 8.73 -0.76
3.05 3.43 -0.38
p-value = 0.067 Since a < p-value, do not reject Ho.
Number of incomplete tasks
treatment 1treatment 2difference IA (treatment 1 - treatment 2)
0 2 -2
3 0 3
5 0 5
1 1 0
4 0 4
4 1 3
4 0 4
1 0 1
p-value = 0.016 Since a > p-value, reject Ho.
In addition to p-values, STATGRAPHICS was also used to report confidence
intervals (CI) for each performance measurement. The CI, often called an "interval
estimator," consists of lower and upper confidence limits as two endpoints. Table 4.7
shows the CIs at the 90% and 95% of confidence levels (CLs) for all performance
measurements.90
Table 4.7 Confidence intervals.
Performance Measure CI at 90% CL CI at 95% CL
misprioritizations (0.84,24.66) (-2.12,27.62)
response time (-1.16,7.81) (-2.28,8.92)
aircraft controls (-0.19,3.36) (-0.63,3.79)
incomplete tasks (0.66,3.84) (0.26,4.23)
4.4Interpretation of the Results
The analysis of the experimental results can be summarized using the following
three parameters: (a) performance improvement with the CTMS, (b) p-values, and
(c) confidence intervals. Performance improvement average results demonstrated that
task prioritization performance improved by 41%, that subject response time improved
by 18%, that aircraft control tasks improved by 24%, and that task completion
improved by 82%.
From the p-values generated by ANOVA, the results "conclusively"
demonstrated evidence of improvement in the completion of flight tasks when the
subjects flew with the CTMS, whereas the results were "suggestive" with respect to
evidence of improvement in the other three performance measurements.
Finally, according to the statistical confidence levels (Table 4.7), one could
have some degree of confidence that simulator flight performance can be improved
when subjects fly with the CTMS. Therefore, the overall results of the experiment
conducted for the present study indicated that relatively significant improvement was
achieved when the subjects flew with the assistance of the CTMS.91
5. DISCUSSION
This chapter presents a general discussion of this research project including the
effectiveness of the CTMS, the contributions and limitations of the research, and a
proposed set of design guidelines for a "real-world" CTMS.
5.1CTMS Effectiveness
A prototype CTMS was successfully developed for the present research project,
and the experimental results for the evaluation of CTMS effectiveness indicated that
subject performance improved when flying with the assistance of the CTMS. However,
since the present study was performed in a highly simplified aircraft operating
environment, the success of the CTMS development cannot be generalized to guarantee
the feasibility of the implementation of this type of PVI for an extremely complex real-
world aircraft environment. By the same token, demonstration of the significance of the
prototype CTMS developed for this project cannot validate the effectiveness of this type
of PVI for real aircraft.
Despite the fact that a real-world CTMS may not be possible in the near future,
what was learned from and demonstrated by this research should prove valuable to
future CTM studies in a narrow view, as well as to progress in aviation human factors
in a general and broader sense. Given that only eight subjects were used to collect the
performance data, the experimental results nonetheless indicated that the CTMS
provided effective subject flight simulator performance assistance. Though the current
version of the CTMS was developed and evaluated in a laboratory using a low-fidelity92
flight simulator flown by non-professional subject pilots, the potential value of such a
PVI (pilot-vehicle interface) was demonstrated by the findings of this research.
5.2Research Contributions
First, through the successful development of a prototype CTMS, a feasible
approach to the implementation of a real-world CTMS was demonstrated. Although the
development of a CTMS for real aircraft will require a major upgrade from the CTMS
developed for the present research, the fundamental and essential aspects of a CTMS
seem to have been adequately demonstrated by the research findings.
Second, the potential significance of a PVI such as the CTMS was verified. The
results of the experiment indicated that the CTMS developed provided effective CTM
performance assistance. Given that performance testing was conducted in an
experimental environment, the potential effectiveness of a real-world CTMS was
demonstrated by the research findings.
Third, the flight simulator used for CTMS testing was enhanced. Some of the
existing displays and controls were modified in consideration of basic principles of
human factors. For example, the push buttons simulated in the CDU (cockpit display
unit) were so small in the previous simulator that it was difficult to place the cursor on
the buttons that had to be pushed. Thus, the size of the CDU buttons was increased to
make the button-push action a relatively user-friendly action in the new simulator.
Since there were no aircraft symbols displayed in the PLAN mode in the previous
simulator, the subject was required to pay extra attention to locating current aircraft
position while he/she flew using the PLAN mode. In the modified simulator, an aircraft93
symbola small red circular dotwas added to the PLAN mode display. In addition
to these modifications, new functions were added to enrich the simulator. For theATC
communication panel, push buttons to change command airspeed and altitude and a
navigation page for replanning the current flight path were some of the new features
which made the modified simulator more realistic.
Fourth, Funk's (1991) CTM theory was revised. That is, CTM functions were
separated into two categories: goals and functions. Also, the state transitions for tasks
were refined, and the status transitions for tasks were developed.A concrete and
comprehensive framework for the state and status transitions was established and may
be utilized in future studies using different experimental setups.
Fifth, a reasonable method to measure task prioritization performance was
developed. Many different techniques and methods could be used to measure the task
prioritization. In the CTM study by Chou (1991), a score of one was assigned for a
correct prioritization; a minus one was assigned for a misprioritization. According to
the measuring technique, the performance of the subject who committed five
misprioritizations out of 20 opportunities for misprioritization was considered to be
better than the subject who made nine correct prioritizations out of nine opportunities,
an inherently unfair situation. Another possible way to measurethe prioritization
performance would be to count the number of misprioritizations committed in a time
unit. However, this method has shortcomings when it is applied to a pilot who
encountered more opportunities for misprioritization than other pilots. The experiment
performed for the present research demonstrated that the number of opportunities for
misprioritization varied from 8 to 39 in the CTMS flights, and from 6 to 50 in flights
without the CTMS, depending upon how the subjects flew even as they were flying94
identical flight scenarios. Thus, measuring the ratio of misprioritizations to
opportunities for misprioritization was proposed and used. In addition, a task activity
chart was developed to facilitate the effort to count the number of misprioritizations in
multiple, concurrent flight task situations.
Finally, this research will provide an eventual contribution to aviation safety.
As the potential usefulness of the CTMS is verified by improvement of the pilot's
CTMS performance as well as general aircraft controls, such a pilot aid could be an
effective enhancement of aircraft safety.
5.3Research Limitations
As is true of most academic research performed in small laboratories, a number
of limitations were encountered throughout this project. The principal limitation was
lack of realism, resulting primarily from use of the existing flight simulator. Since the
PC-based low-fidelity flight simulator used cannot represent the activities of a real-
world aircraft, developing a realistic CTMS for such an environment was not possible.
Therefore, a prototype CTMSand not a real-world CTMSwas developed for use in
this research project. However, even while a prototype was developed, a number of
limitations continued to be apparent.
First, resources for the development of the CTMS were limited. Since the
CTMS was primarily developed only by the researcher within a limited time frame,
system refinement was not performed. Therefore, a number of cumbersome features
exist in the current version of the CTMS and the system remained inefficient to a
certain degree. The CTMS also had to be developed with computer hardware and95
software limitations for reason of cost factors as well as the limitations of the
capabilities of the researcher. That is, the selection of the computer hardware and
software used for this project was primarily based upon availability, rather than upon
performance.
Second, size and qualification of the sample was limited. In general, confidence
in the results of an experiment is increased as sample size is increased. However, since
sampling is both time-consuming and very costly, it is often useful to minimize the
sample size. In addition, the supply of volunteer subjects was limited. Although
confidence in the results of an experiment would have increased as sample size was
increased, only eight subjects were used for the collection of performance data,
primarily because of time and effort required to recruit volunteer subjects. In addition
to limited numbers, the qualifications of the subjects were also limited. To obtain more
realistic performance data, the use of licensed pilot volunteers was preferred, but only
four licensed pilots were available from among the eight subjects used in the data-
collecting sessions.
Finally, the validity of the experimental results was limited. Though every
effort was made to conduct experiments free of bias, it was always possible that biased
output could have been created. That is, the experimental results could be biased as a
result of:(a) variant conditions in the training sessions (e.g., condition of the trainer
and trainees), (b) environment of the experiment (e.g., noise, temperature, or time-of-
day), and (c) variant conditions in the data-collecting sessions (e.g., subject ability to
concentrate attention upon the tasks).96
5.4Design Guidelines for a Real-World CTMS
Several recommendations for designing a CTM-oriented PVI were proposed by
Funk (1991), Chou (1991), and Madhavan (1993). The recommendations can be
summarized as follows:
1. Maintain a model of the flightcrew task environment and the aircraft state;
2. Recognize conditions for the initiation and termination of tasks, and inform
the flightcrew to so engage in the absence of initiation or termination action;
3. Provide the flightcrew with a continuous assessment of task status and its
priority in the agenda, and allocate system resources accordingly;
4. Provide the flightcrew with a holistic view of the aircraft state (system state)
and its relation to the outside world (world state);
5. Help the flightcrew prioritize tasks;
6. Help the flightcrew initiate tasks;
7. Help the flightcrew terminate tasks;
8. Help the flightcrew interrupt tasks; and
9. Help the flightcrew resume interrupted tasks.
Based on these design recommendations as well as what was learned during the
present research project, design guidelines for a real-world CTMS are proposed as
follows:
1. Design the CTMS display to be as simple as possible.
Modern flightcrews are already overwhelmed by a large number of cockpit
displays and controls. As a result, it takes time to train pilots to be familiar with all of
the cockpit display and control functions. When a real-world CTMS is developed and97
added to the cockpit, the CTMS display may distract the flightcrew, rather then assist
them, unless the display is given a simple structure. If the CTMS display is not
sufficiently simple to avoid flightcrew cognitive overload or distraction, then extra time
should be spent to adequately train flightcrews in the use of the additional display.
2. Maintain state information for tasks and provide this information to the
flightcrew.
According to CTM theory as presented in this research, the state of a task is
either `latent,' upcoming,"in-progress,"suggested,' or 'finished.' A CTMS should
maintain state information for tasks. To do this, the CTMS should also maintain the
condition which triggers transitions from one state to another for each task, and
perform the transitions when the CTMS recognizes that the corresponding conditions
are satisfied. Finally, the CTMS should provide the flightcrew with state information
about mission-critical tasks. For the present project, only information on 'upcoming,'
`in-progress,' and 'suggested' tasks were provided in the CTMS display.
3. Maintain status information for tasks and provide the information to the
flightcrew.
The status of a task is either 'satisfactory' or 'unsatisfactory.' A CTMS should
maintain information for task status as well as task state. To do this, the CTMS should
maintain the status triggering condition for each task, and perform the transition when
the corresponding condition is satisfied.Finally, the CTMS should provide the
flightcrew with status information about such mission-critical status conditions as
`upcoming,' in-progress,' and 'suggested' tasks.98
4. Maintain priorities among tasks and provide the information to the flightcrew.
In general, a task is called active when it is 'in-progress' or 'suggested.' A
CTMS should maintain the priorities of the active tasks and provide the flightcrew with
appropriate information. To generate priorities which are dynamic and context-
sensitive, a valid prioritization scheme should be developed.
In general, task priorities should be reflected by a number of factors, including
the: (a) importance, (b) urgency, and (c) continuity of the task. Importance is an
absolute factor for measurement of task priorities. The task in_flight_engine_restart is
generally considered more important than the task engage_autopilot. Or, one task is
more urgent than another and should be completed first. That is, when the GPWS
(ground proximity warning system) alerts the flightcrew to the impending CFIT
(controlled flight into terrain), maintain_altitude must be more urgent than
lower_landing_gear, and the higher priority should be assigned to the former task even
if it is generally less important than the latter. Continuity has to do with how close a
task is to completion. The closer a task is to completion, then the higher priority it
should be assigned. For example, if an ATC command set_airspeed_to_500 is received
when the pilot has one last button-push to complete the autopilot engagement procedure
after a one-minute effort, it would be probable that the pilot would push the last button
and complete the autopilot engagement procedure before he/she starts to change the
airspeed, even if the comply_with_ATC_command task was more important and urgent.
A partial, but not comprehensive, prioritization of the flight tasks is currently
performed in conjunction with EICAS (engine indication and crew alerting system) in a
modern aircraft cockpit. A valid comprehensive prioritization scheme in a context of a
real aircraft has not been introduced to this date, and it could be a potentially complex99
undertaking to develop such a system. However, it would be essential to have such a
prioritization capability to assure full functionality of the CTMS.
5. Maintain access to the state parameters of important aircraft subsystems.
An aircraft subsystem has a set of parameters representing the state of the
system. For example, an engine is represented by a set of parameters which include
thrust level, engine pressure ratio (EPR), exhaust gas temperature (EGT), and so on. A
CTMS should be able to access to the state parameters of such mission-critical aircraft
subsystems as the engines or the hydraulic system, to continuously assess the status of
tasks concerning them.
6. Use object-oriented design (OOD) methodology to implement the CTMS.
The use of OOD has been increased gradually over the last several years. The
object-oriented approach has been employed for the design of various systems,
including engineering applications, database management systems (DBMS), and
computer operating systems (Stark, 1993; Wayner, 1994; Marlon Stein, 1994).
Because of the manner in which it fits the design needs of a complex system like a
CTMS, the OOD was an appropriate approach for the implementation of the present
research. Based on the experience of the use of OOD in this research, it is firmly
recommended that OOD be used as a development tool for a real-world CTMS. In
addition, it is recommended that the basic architecture used for the development of the
CTMS in this project be adopted. That is, develop TAs and have them maintain state
and status information of the corresponding flight tasks. Development of SAs may not
be necessary as long as the CTMS is able to access the state parameters of aircraft
subsystems. However, implementing SAs as well as TAs would make a real-world
CTMS more complete and understandable, and therefore useful.100
6. CONCLUSIONS
Aircraft accidents and incidents related to human errors have been the subject of
increasing public concern. Statistical data have indicated that approximately two-thirds
of all aircraft accidents are attributable to pilot error. According to the research
findings of Chou (1991) and Madhavan (1993), CTM errors have been significant
factors in a large number of aircraft accidents and incidents.
In the effort to mitigate CTM-related pilot errors, a pilot-vehicle interface (PVI)
called the cockpit task management system (CTMS) was developed for the present
study. Object-oriented design (00D) and distributed artificial intelligence (DAI)
concepts, as well as CTM theory as revised for the present study, were used for the
implementation of the CTMS, which was then integrated into a flight simulator to
perform an experimental effectiveness evaluation. Eight subjects were used to collect
performance data for the experiment. Each subject flew two simulator flight
scenariosone with and one without the CTMSand subject performances were
compared between flying with and without the CTMS. Four measurements were
considered for the evaluation of subject performance: (a) task prioritization, (b) pilot
response time, (c) aircraft controls, and (d) task completion.
The results of the subject performance data showed that when subjects flew with
the assistance of the CTMS, mean task prioritization performance was improved by
41%, mean task initiation performance was improved by 18%, mean aircraft control
performance was improved by 24%, and mean task completion performance was
improved by 82%. An ANOVA for the research hypothesis resulted in p-values of
0.066, 0.093, 0.052, and 0.009, respectively, for task prioritization, pilot response101
time, aircraft controls, and task completion. The mean subject performance
improvements, in conjunction with these p-values, suggest that significant improvement
was observed when subjects flew with the assistance of the CTMS.
Analysis of paired-t tests, with scenario and learning effects neglected, resulted
in p-values of 0.041, 0.102, 0.067, and 0.016, respectively, for task prioritization, pilot
response time, aircraft controls, and task completion. Based upon confidence intervals
obtained from the paired-t tests, it may be stated with relatively high confidence that the
assistance provided by the CTMS was an effective aid to subject performance
improvement using the flight simulator. Therefore, the experimental research described
has demonstrated the potential value of a CTMS-like PVI for aircraft applications.
The contribution of the present research included (a) demonstration of the
feasibility of a real-world implementation through the development of the CTMS as a
successful prototype, (b) verification of the potential significance of a CTMS-like PVI,
(c) enhancement of the existing flight simulator, and (d) refinement of existing CTM
theory. On the other hand, the limitations of this study included (a) a lack of
experimental realism, which is not an exception for most academic laboratory research;
(b) constraints with respect to human resources, (c) experimental materials, and time;
and (d) potentially biased experimental results.
Finally, a set of design guidelines for a real-world CTMS was developed based
on the findings of the present research as well as the design recommendations for a
CTMS-like PVI provided by other researchers. The guidelines developed can be
summarized in the following four principles:(a) the CTMS display should be simple;
(b) the CTMS should provide the flightcrew with task state, status, and priority
information, (c) the CTMS should be able to access the state parameters of important102
aircraft subsystems, and (d) the use of OOD methodology should be considered for the
implementation of a real-world CTMS.
The development of a CTMS-like PVI for a "real" aircraft may not be feasible
in the near future for reason of potential technical as well as non-technical barriers to
further progress at this time. Nonetheless, the research findings of this project will be
useful for general PVI studies as well as for future CTM studies. By the same token,
the ultimate contributions of the present research project are not necessarily confined to
the issue of aviation safety, but the principles derived could be extended to the safety
issue everywherein the home, in schools, and in general industry as well.103
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Appendix A. Basic Controls and Displays
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FLIGHT SIMULATOR
The flight simulator used in the experiment consists of four
computer monitors, a computer keyboard, two trackballs, and a
sidestick controller.Figure A.1 shows the overall structure
of the flight simulator.
The top monitor shows the head up display (HUD).The HUD
displays the aircraft model and the simulated out-the-window-
view as well as the current and command headings, airspeeds,
and altitudes.The sidestick controller is a joystick.It
controls the pitch and roll of the aircraft; the pitch
controls the altitude and the roll controls the heading.
The flight task display (FTD) shows information about the
flight tasks.The navigation display (ND) shows information
about flight navigation, and the subsystem display (SD) shows
information about aircraft subsystems.Besides displaying
this information, the ND and the SD provide simulated
switches for the pilot to control the aircraft subsystems.
The pilot can control the switches using the keyboard and
trackballs.The keyboard and trackball #1 are to control the
switches in the ND, and trackball #2 is to control the
switches in the SD.
There are two types of simulated switches in the simulator:
buttons and knobs.Small rectangular switches are buttons;
big round switches are knobs (see screen #3).To push a
button, place the cursor onto the button icon and click the
left trackball button.To dial a knob, place the cursor onto
the knob icon and click the left trackball button to move it
left (counterclockwise); click the right button to move it
right (clockwise).The middle button is not used in the
experiment.SCREEN #1"HUD" (Head Up Display)
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SCREEN #1 -"HUD"
Screen #1 shows a snapshot of the HUD (head up display). It
displays the aircraft's current heading, airspeed, and
altitude (0 degrees, 221 miles/hour, and 26,000 feet).The
numbers on the outer rim are the command heading, airspeed,
and altitude (0 degrees, 220 miles/hour, and 30,000 feet).
The pitch ladder indicates the pitch and roll angle with
respect to the aircraft.
The other information displayed on the screen includes the
current system time (50), the communication status between
other experiment computers (ON), the aircraft position (North
2.9 miles and East 0 mile), and the autopilot status
(engaged).When an autopilot fault occurs, the autopilot
status message will disappear from the screen.
The cross at the center of the screen was used to depict the
nose of the aircraft.The short horizontal bar located at
the middle of the command and current airspeeds (220 and 221)
shows the deviation between the two values.The short bar at
the middle of the current and command altitudes (26,000 and
30,000) also shows the deviation.The short vertical bar
below current heading also shows the deviation of the current
heading from the command heading.SCREEN #2 "FTD" (Flight Task Display)
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The FTD (flight task display) shows states (upcoming/
suggested/in-progress) and status (satisfactory/
unsatisfactory) of flight tasks.
The FTD consists of three sections:(1) SUGGESTED task
display (STD),(2) UPCOMING task display (UTD), and (3)IN-
PROGRESS task display (ITD).Suggested flight tasks,
upcoming flight tasks, and in-progress flight tasksare
displayed on those display sections, respectively.On the
UTD and ITD, the tasks are displayed in hierarchical
structure.On the STD, the tasks are displayed in the order
of priority.A pilot should respond to the highest priority
task first, which is displayed at the top of theSTD.
Status information is shown by three colors:green, red, and
yellow.Green indicates that progress of the task is
satisfactory.Red or yellow indicates a system faultor
unsatisfactory progress of the task.For a red message
(alert), the pilot must correct the system faultor correct
unsatisfactory progress of the task.For a yellow message
(informative), the pilot must acknowledge the system
abnormality or correct unsatisfactory taskprogress.
Screen #2 indicates that the aircraft is cruising, and it is
heading to the waypoint AST.The flight task Cruise is not
satisfactory because its subtask FlyToWaypoint AST isnot
satisfactory (indicated by yellow color).The task
FlyToWaypoint AST is unsatisfactory because twosystem
faults, LeftCDUFault and RightHYDValve, have been detected
and displayed on the STD.Flight tasks, FlyToWaypoint COM,
FlyToWaypoint DIR, and FlyToTopOfDescent, whichare subtasks
of Cruise, are upcoming tasks.Descent, which is currently
an upcoming task, will be an in-progress task when the Cruise
task is finished.The gray color is used in displaying the
Cruise task on the UTD because Cruise is notan upcoming task
anymore.It is displayed on the UTD only because some of its
subtasks, FlyToWaypoint COM, FlyToWaypoint DIR, and
FlyToTopOfDescent, are still upcoming tasks.Cruise has
become an in-progress task because one of its subtasks
FlyToWaypoint AST has become an in-progress task.If a gray
color is used in displaying a task on the ITD, it indicates
that the task has been finished.A correct-system-fault task
LeftIRSFault is satisfactory and in-progress because the task
is being taken care of correctly.SCREEN #3 - "ND" (Navigation Display)
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From right to left, top to bottom, the ND (navigation
display) contains the following:
1. Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI)
Depending on the mode selected by the ND mode selector,
there are two types of displays in the HSI.
a. MAP mode:The HSI displays an inside-out aircraft-
centered view that shows the map of the
current flight path and waypoints in the
flight path.
b. PLAN mode: The HSI displays, in a north-up orientation,
all waypoints including the waypoints in the
current flight path so that the pilot can
delete a waypoint from the current flight
path or add a new waypoint to the flight
path.
2. Automatic Flight Control (AFC) Panel
The AFC is a control panel that has two knobs (ND Mode
Selector and ND Range Selector) and twelve buttons.The
ND Mode Selector is to select the desired display mode of
the HSI, and the ND Range Selector is to select the
desired nautical mile range of the HSI.The left
trackball button should be clicked to move an ND Selector
left; the right button should be clicked to move an ND
Selector ricrht.Currently only MAP and PLAN mode are
implemented in the Mode Selector.(VOR and APP modes are
not implemented.)
Among the twelve buttons in this panel, the upper left
three buttons are called Map Switches.The Map Switches
select information to be displayed on the HSI.The upper
right three buttons are called Command Switches.The
Command Switches and the other six buttons are used to
change command values (command airspeed, altitude, and
heading).For example, the Command Switch labeled 'SPD'
and the two arrow buttons located below the Command Switch
are used to change command airspeed.The procedure to
change command values is as follows:
(1) Set the ND Mode Selector to PLAN mode ('PLN').
(2) Push the appropriate Command Switch ('SPD','ALT',
or 'HDG' button).The command value displayed at
the upper right corner of the HSI will be
highlighted.117
(3) Keep pushing an arrow button until the highlighted
command value reaches the desired number.This
changes the command values.
(4) Restore buttons: Command Switch -> OFF
ND Mode Selector -> MAP mode
The Map Switches may be selected simultaneously, and a
second push removes the information.WXR displays radar
data that shows storm areas.POS displays the current
position of the aircraft.DATA displays the name of the
waypoint the aircraft is flying to, estimated time to
arrive, and command values.
Screen #3 shows that the MAP mode with an 80 nautical
miles scale is selected.All the Map Switches, WXR, POS,
and DATA, are selected.According to the selections made
in the AFC panel, the HSI shows the current flight path
(IBM-AST-COM-...) with 80 miles scale, a storm area around
the waypoint DOS (red circle), and the current aircraft
position (N16 E0).It also shows that the aircraft is
flying to waypoint AST and is expected to arrive there in
6 seconds.
3. Source Select Panel
A source selector controls the mode of a main component of
a flight instrument.There are four source selectors in
this panel:flight director (FLT DIR), navigation
computer (NAV), electrical input unit (EIU), and inertial
reference system (IRS).The labels surrounding the knobs
indicate their modes.
4. ATC Communication Panel
The ATC (air traffic control) Panel has two purposes:
a. sending a request message to ATC, and
b. displaying a command from ATC.
As shown in screen #3, this panel has a button called ATC
Button.The ATC Panel has three modes:request (REQ),
acknowledge (ACK), and clear panel (CLR) modes.The label
on the button indicates the mode of the ATC Panel to be
set when the button is pushed.The screen shows that it
will be set to 'request' mode if the button is pushed.
The procedure to send a message to an ATC is as follows:
(1) Push the ATC Button (REQ) in the ATC Panel.
(An I-beam shaped text cursor will appear.)
(2) Type a request message using the keyboard.118
(3) Hit <ENTER> to send the message to ATC.
(The I-beam shaped text cursor will disappear.A
reply message from the ATC will be displayedon the
same panel a few seconds after it is sent.)
When an ATC command is received and displayedon this
panel, the pilot has to comply with the command.Two
kinds of ATC commands will be given to the pilot in the
experiment:change of command altitude and change of
command airspeed.The procedure to comply with an ATC
command is described in the Flight Manual.SCREEN #4 "SD" (Subsystem Display)
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From right to left, top to bottom, the controls and displays
in the SD (subsystem display) are as follows:
1. Throttle Control Panel
The aircraft speed depends on the thrust setting.Screen
#4 shows 80% thrust on both engines, which will produce
maximum airspeed of 600 miles/hour.At this speed, higher
thrust level will not increase the airspeed but will
increase the fuel consumption.To change the thrust on
any one engine, move the cursor to the desired thrust
level (the hot point of the cursor must be placed in the
projected area of the designated control column) and click
the left trackball button.Dragging one of the throttle
icons (two black arrows in the panel) will also change the
thrust setting.
2. Subsystem Display Control Panel
This panel has six buttons that are used toaccess the
status of subsystems of the aircraft.The subsystems
include engine (ENG), fuel system (FUE), hydraulic system
(HYD), electric control system (ECS), landing gear system
(GER), and extra electric system (EES).When the pilot
pushes any one button, the associated synopsis display
will be shown on the Auxiliary EICAS which is located
below this panel.Pushing the same button a second time
will toggle the display status for that subsystem.Only
one system synoptic may be displayed at a time.Screen #4
shows that FUE button is pushed and the fuel system
synoptic is displayed on the Auxiliary EICAS.The
contents of each subsystem display are explained below.
ENGdisplays engine synoptic for secondary engine
indications. (The primary engine indications are
displayed on the Main EICAS.)
FUEdisplays the fuel system synoptic.It shows the
status of the three pumps for fuel tanks (center,
mainl, and main2 pumps) and the fuel valves to
control the fuel flow.It also shows the total and
current amount of fuel in each tank.
HYDdisplays the hydraulic system synoptic.
ECSdisplays the electrical power system synoptic.121
GERdisplays the landing gear system synoptic.It shows
the status of the landing gear system components
such as landing gears and landing gear doors.
EESdisplays the extra electrical systems synoptic.
3. Flap Control Panel
This panel provides the function to change flap settings.
The flaps are set by discrete degrees:0,1,5, 10, 20,
25, and 30 degrees.Flap angle must be set at 0 from
Climb through Descent phase.During Approach, they have
to be set according to current airspeed as shown below:
Airspeed Flap Anale
220 10
185 20
150 25
To change the flap setting, place the cursor onto one of
the two arrow buttons in this panel and click the left
trackball button.The up-arrow button will decrease the
flap angle and the down-arrow button will increase the
flap angle.The number surrounded by the rectangular box
indicates the current selection of the flap setting.The
Flap Control Panel in screen #4 shows that zero degrees of
flap setting is selected.
Once the pilot selects a flap setting, the flaps will
complete their transition in five seconds.When the flaps
are deployed, their graphical representation (flap
synoptic) will be displayed on the lower right area of the
Main EICAS.The Main EICAS in screen #4 indicates the
flaps are not extended at all (zero degrees) because the
flap synoptic is not displayed on it.
4. Gear Control Panel
This panel provides control of the landing gear.The gear
lever, which is represented by the black square icon in
this panel, controls the gear.To lower the landing gear,
pull the gear lever down by clicking the left trackball
button after placing the cursor near the 'DN' label; to
raise the gear, push the lever up by clicking the left
trackball button after placing the cursor near the 'UP'
label.
When the pilot pulls the gear lever down, the landing gear
will be down and locked.When the pilot pushes the lever
up, the gear will be up and the gear door will be closed.
It takes ten seconds to transition the gear.When the122
transition has been completed, the updatedgear and gear
door status will be displayed on the Auxiliary EICAS (if
the GER button in the Subsystem Display Control Panel is
selected).The status of the gear and gear doorsare
displayed inside the rectangular box labeled
'GEARS/DOORS'.'CLOSED' indicates that the gear is up and
the gear door is closed; 'LOCKED' indicates that thegear
is down and locked.During the gear transition, thegear
door status will change to a magenta color.
5. Engine Control Panel
There are three types of switches in this panel:engine
start buttons, continuous ignition button, and ignition
selectors.The two toggle buttons on the first row
(labeled 'OFF' now) are the engine start buttons.The
rectangle button in the center part of this panel (labeled
'OFF' now) is the continuous ignition button.The two
knobs are ignition selectors (standby ignition selector
and auto ignition selector).These buttons and knobs in
this panel are designed for restarting a specific engine
during flight in case of engine failure.
When an engine fails during flight and inflight engine
restart is needed, the following procedure should be
taken:
(1) Shut down the throttle for the affected engine.
(2) Shut off the fuel supply to the affected engine.
(3) Fly to the inflight restart envelop
(altitude < 30,000).(Stay below 30,000 ft until
the end of this procedure.)
(4) Set up the correct configuration:
STBY knob -> affected engine
AUTO knob -> affected engine
CON button -> ON
START button on affected engine -> ON
(5) Supply fuel to the affected engine.
(6) Open both throttles over 50%.
(7) Observe N1 to more than 50% in the Main EICAS.
(After N1 has been increased to more than 50%, the
throttle may be moved to the desired setting
associated with the current command airspeed.)
(8) Restore the engine control buttons:
START button on affected engine -> OFF
CON button -> OFF
AUTO knob -> BOTH
STBY knob -> NORM123
6. Cockpit Display Unit (CDU)
The CDU provides basic interface functions betweenthe
pilot and the flight management controls other thanthe
functions of aforementioned control panels.It has ten
surrounding buttons that provideways to activate
functions.
A labeled button will carry out a predetermined function.
If a button is not labeled, it does notcarry out any
function.If a button is labeled with a '<'or' >' mark,
it will activate another layer of displaypage when
pushed.If it is labeled with plain text, it willcarry
out a function according to the current system
configuration.Screen #4 shows the Top Page of the CDU
(i.e. main menu).
For the current experiment, the mainpurpose of each
display page is to compensate for system malfunctionsand
abnormalities.SOURCE SELECT page is used for the pilot
to acknowledge source selector abnormalities.SUBSYSTEM
page is used to correct most of system malfunctions,
acknowledge system abnormalities, and cancel false alarms.
In order to correct a system malfunction, which is either
an engine-related fault except engine shutdown (ENG), a
hydraulic system fault (HYD), oran electrical system
fault (ECS or EES), the pilot should bringup the
problematic system page on the CDU and push thereset
button.To acknowledge a system abnormality, bringup the
problematic system page on the CDU and push the
acknowledge button.To cancel a false alarm, bring up the
corresponding system page on the CDU and push the cancel
button.To acknowledge a source selector abnormality (FLT
DIR, NAV, EIU, or IRS), bring up the SOURCE SELECTpage on
the CDU, and push the button which indicates the
problematic source selector.The whole procedure to
correct/acknowledge system faults/abnormalities is
described in the Flight Manual.
The other important function of the CDU is to change the
current flight path by deleting an existing waypoint and
adding a new waypoint.The procedure for rerouting a
flight path is as follows:
(1) Send a request message to ATC for rerouting.
a. Push the ATC Button (REQ) in the ATC
Communication Panel in the ND.
b. Type a request message using the keyboard.
(Hit <ENTER> to go to the second line.)
(examples: 'Request to add ABC after CBS'
'Request to delete NBC')
c. Hit <ENTER> to send the message to ATC.124
(2) Wait for the reply from the ATC.
If the request is approved, push the ATC Button
(CLR) to clear the ATC Panel, and go to the next
step.If not, go back to (1).
(3) Set the ND Mode Selector to PLAN mode ('PLN').
(4) Bring up the Navigation Data Page ('NAV DATA') in
the CDU.
(5) Add a new waypoint to the current flight path,or
delete a waypoint from the current flight path.
To add: a.select a waypoint after which the new
waypoint will be added using the
SELECT WAYPOINT buttons
b. push the ADD AFTER button
c. select a waypoint to add using the
SELECT WAYPOINT buttons
d. push the ADD button
To delete: a. select a waypoint to delete using the
SELECT WAYPOINT buttons
b. push DELETE button
7. Auxiliary EICAS
This display shows the desired subsystem synoptic ifso
desired.If an aircraft subsystem has malfunctioned, the
display will indicate its severity.If it is a serious
fault, a red color will be used, otherwise, a yellow color
will be used.
If a subsystem has malfunctioned and is indicated in the
Auxiliary EICAS, a message associated with the malfunction
will be displayed in the Main EICAS.However, a
malfunction message displayed in the Main EICAS does not
always mean there is an actual system malfunction.A
message may be a false alarm.In a false alarm situation,
the subsystem synoptic displayed on the Auxiliary EICAS
indicates normal:no red or yellow color is in it.
Screen #4 shows the fuel system synoptic on the Auxiliary
EICAS.While other subsystem synoptics just show the
system status, the fuel system synoptic provides control
of the fuel system components as well.The four small
rectangular icons represent fuel pumps left, center, and
right pumps and the two circular icons represent fuel
valves left and right valves.To toggle a pump or a
valve, place the cursor onto the desired icon and click
the left trackball button.The center pump consists of
two components which are represented by two small
rectangular icons.Clicking either icon toggles the
center pump.Once the transition is activated, the color
of the icon will change to magenta indicating the
transition has begun.It takes five seconds to complete125
the transition between modes.The pilot should stay in
the FUE mode until the transition has been completed.In
other words, the pilot should not bring up another display
before the transition has been completed.
Green lines indicate the fuel flow.Screen #4 shows that
the center tank is supplying fuel to both engines.
Currently, both fuel valves are open and only the center
pump is on.The pump icon itself does not tell if it is
on or off.However, the pilot can tell the pump status by
the fuel flow.
8. Main EICAS
The Main EICAS displays the primary engine indicators
(EPR, N1, and EGT) all the time.When the flaps are
deployed, the flap synoptic is displayed on the lower
right area of the Main EICAS.It also displays messages
regarding system faults when a pilot flies the simulator
without flight task display (FTD).(When a pilot flies
with the FTD, messages indicating system faults as well as
other abnormal system status will be displayed on the
FTD.)A red message indicates a serious system fault and
a yellow message indicates an informative system
abnormality.
There are six levels of priorities among the system
faults.A serious system fault has a priority of either
4,5, or 6.An informative system abnormality has
priority of either 1,2, or 3.Messages will be displayed
in the order of priorities, and the messages informing
system faults and informative system abnormality will be
displayed in red and yellow colors, respectively.Within
the same level of priority, the messages will be placed on
a first-come-first-display order.However, a system fault
message does not always mean a real system fault.In
other words, a message may be a false alarm.To find out
whether or not the message is a false alarm, the pilot
should bring up the corresponding aircraft subsystem
synotic display, as described in previous section.A
general guideline for the priorities of system faults is
as follows and the pilot is required to remember the
priorities.(A comprehensive list of task priorities is
in the Flight Manual.)126
Priority
(message color) Problems Messages
7 (red) Controlled Flight Climb Climb!!'
Into Terrain
(CFIT)
6 (red) Engine Shutdown
5(red)
4 (red)
Engine-related
faults other than
engine Shutdown
Subsystem faults
other than
engine
Source selector
faults
3 (yellow) Subsystem or
source selector
abnormalities
(informative)
'Restart Engine'
'EGT High'
'Engine Oil Low'
'EES Temp High'
'Left HYD Press High'
'ECS Bus Fault',
'Lower Landing Gear'
'Maintain Fuel Supp.'
(< 3,000 lbs)
and etc.
'AUTO EIU Fault'
'Right FMC Fault'
'Left FD Fault'
and etc.
'Right HYD Valve'
'Maintain Fuel Supp.'
(< 5,000 lbs)
'Balance Fuel'
'Left IRS On DC'
and etc.
2 (yellow) Subsystem or
source selector
faults (informing
that a backup
system is being
used)
1 (yellow) Autopilot fault
'EES On Backup'
'EIU On Backup'
'NAV On Backup'
and etc.
'Restore Autopilot'Appendix B. Flight Manual
Flight Manual
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1. Initial Setting
Upon start a flight, the pilot should do the following:
(1) Start increasing altitude to reach to the cruise
altitude. (Initially, the aircraft is in climb
phase.)
(2) Push all Map Switches (WXR, POS, and DATA buttons) in
the AFC Panel.
(3) Bring up fuel system synoptic on the Auxiliary EICAS.
Map Switches should be always turned on throughout the
flight.The fuel system synoptic should be always
displayed on the Auxiliary EICAS unless other synoptic
needs to be brought up.In other words, a normal display
setup requires turning on Map Switches and displaying the
fuel system synoptic.
2. Flying
A pilot should control the aircraft to maintain the correct
heading, airspeed, and altitude.
Controls:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The joystick
aircraft.
The top trigger on the joystick activates the
heading-hold autopilot.Autopilot status will be
displayed at the lower right corner of the HUD
display.When it has malfunctioned, the status
message will disappear from the HUD display with a
warning beep.However, the autopilot malfunction
message won't be displayed in the Auxiliary EICAS.
When flying with an FTD (flight task display), the
message will be displayed in the STD (suggested task
display) with a warning beep.
The throttle controls the speed.The relationship
between percent throttle and airspeed is shown in the
table below:
controls the pitch,yaw, and roll of the
Percent Throttle Airspeed
>= 80% 600
70% 530
60% 450
50% 370
40% 300
35% 260
30% 220
25% 185
20% 1503Approach
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At the beginning of the approach phase of the flight, the
cockpit configuration should be:
current altitude -> around 10,000 ft
command altitude -> 1,500 ft
command airspeed -> 220 mile/hr
flap -> 0 degrees
During the approach phase (when your fly-to waypointis the
last waypoint on the current flight path), the following
procedure should be taken:
(1) First, the pilot should start descending and reduce
the current airspeed to 220.The flap should be
extended to 10 degrees.
<NOTE> To change the flap setting, push one of
the two arrow buttons in the Flap Control
Panel.The down-arrow button will increase
the flap angle.Once pushed, the flaps will
complete their transition in five seconds.
When the flaps are deployed, their graphical
representation will be shown on the lower
right area of the Main EICAS.
(2) When the aircraft descends to 4,000 ft, the command
airspeed will become 185.Then, the pilot should
reduce the airspeed to 185, and extend the flaps to
20 degrees.
(3) When the aircraft descends to 2,000 ft, the command
airspeed will become 150.Then, the pilot should
reduce the airspeed to 150, and extend the flaps to
25 degrees.
(4) At any time during the approach phase (before start
landing phase), the pilot should lower the landing
gear.Once the landing gear is down, it will be
automatically locked unless the gear has failed.
<NOTE> The landing gear lever, which is
represented by the black square icon in the
Gear Control Panel, controls the landinggear.
To lower the landing gear and lock it, pull
the landing gear lever down by clicking the
left trackball button after placing thecursor
near the 'DN' label; to raise the gear, push
the lever up by clicking the left trackball
button after placing the cursor near the 'UP'
label.If the gear does not go to the desired state,
a malfunction message will be displayed on
either the Main EICAS or the FTD.To correct
the landing gear fault, bring up thegear
synoptic on the Auxiliary EICAS, and repeat
pushing up and pulling down the gear lever
until the gear synoptic shows the desiredgear
state.
It takes about five seconds to transition the
gear.When the gear is transitioning, the
gear door status will change to a magenta
color indicating the gear transition.
4. Land
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When the aircraft has ten miles to go to the final waypoint,
it is in land phase. As described in the last section, the
aircraft should be fully configured (landinggear down and
locked, and flap 25 degrees) before land phase has begun.
5. Fuel Management
During a flight, the pilot should perform two tasks in order
to manage the fuel system: maintaining fuel supply to both
engines and maintaining fuel balance.The pilot can perform
the two tasks by operating fuel pumps and fuel valves.The
pumps and valves are toggled on and off by clicking on the
representative icons, and it takes about two seconds for
such an action to take effect.Initially, the pumps and
valves are properly opened so that fuel in the center tank
can be used.
Maintaining Fuel Supply: After the center tank has less than
10,000 lbs of fuel, the pilot should start mainl and main2
pumps by clicking the pump icons so that fuel in mainl and
main2 tanks can be used.
Balancing Fuel: If the difference in fuel quantity between
the two main tanks is greater than 500 lbs., the fuel is
unbalanced.If an unbalanced fuel condition exists, the
following corrective procedure should be taken:
(1) Open both valves by clicking the valve icons.
(2) Stop the main pump whose tank has a low fuel quantity
by clicking the main pump icon.(Now, only one main
pump supplies fuel to both engines.)
(3) Wait until the desired fuel balance is attained.
(The difference should be under 300 lbs.)
(4) Open the main pump that was stopped.
(5) Close both valves by clicking the valve icons.131
6.Reroute Flight Path
Weather may be a problem.Use the WXR button in the AFC
Panel to check for bad weather condition.Use the PLAN mode
on the HSI to plan for a safe flight route.If a storm
appears along the flight path, reroute as follows:
(1) Send a request message to ATC for rerouting.
a. Push the ATC Button (REQ)
in the ATC Communication
Panel in the ND.
REQ
kACK
MCLR
b. Type a request message using the keyboard.
(Hit <ENTER> to go to the second line.)
example 1:
'Request to add CLS
after COM'
Request to add REQ
CLS after COM umu
CLR
example 2:
'Request to delete DIR'Request to delete
DIR
ACK
CLR
c. Hit <ENTER> to send the message to ATC.
(2) Wait for the reply from the
ATC.If the request is
approved, push the ATC
Button (CLR) to clear
the ATC panel, and go to
the next step.If not, go
back to (1).
(3) Set the ND Mode Selector to
PLAN mode ('PLN').
(4) Bring up the Navigation Data
Page ('NAV DATA') in the CDU. Top Page
(SOURCE SELECT
<MAU DATA
<SUBSYSTEMS132
(5) Add a new waypoint to the current flight path, or delete
a waypoint from the current flight path.
To add:
a. select a waypoint after
which the new waypoint
will be added using the
SELECT WAYPOINT buttons
b. push the ADD AFTER button
c. select a waypoint to add
using the SELECT WAYPOINT
buttons
d. push the ADD button
41 SELECT WYPTS
ADD AFTER ADD
DELETE MAIN>
Nav i gat i oh
To add. OIR OELEB
IBM AST COMCLSALT
41SELECT WYPTS
ADD AFTER ADD
DELETE MAIM)
!4-!:!. Navigation:
> CLS is added
IBM AST COMMALT
I SELECT WYPTS
ADD AFTER ADD
DELETE MAIN>To delete:
a. select a waypoint to
delete using the
SELECT WAYPOINT buttons
b. push DELETE button
RaY gat ion
> Selecting wypts..
EM AST 0111MIALT
SELECT 144IPTS
ADD AFTER ADD
'DELETE MAIN>
Nay iga.t /on
DIR is deleted
ISM AST COHEN DOS
SELECT WYPTS
ADD AFTER ADD
DELETE MAIN>134
7. Comply with ATC Commands
There are two types of ATC commands in the experiment:
changing altitude and changing airspeed.When an ATC
command has been received, the command will appear at the
ATC Communication Panel and the pilot should comply with the
command.The pilot should change the current value as well
as its command value.
Changing Altitude
Command: e.g.'Descend to 28000' or 'Climb to 33000'
Procedure:
(1) Start descending (or climbing).
(When the desired altitude is attained, maintain it.)
(2) Push the ATC Button
(ACK) in the ATC
Communication Panel.
Descent to 2.80043ra(REQ
talk ACK
TCLR
(3) Set the ND Mode Selector
to PLAN mode ('PLN').
VOR HAP
APP
40 80 160
20 320
PLN 10 640
/-COMMAND-\
WXRPOS DATA SPOALTHOG
(4) Push the ALT button (ALT button -> ON).
The command altitude (30,000 ft) at the upper right
corner of the HSI will be highlighted.
ASTETA: 6
SPO: 600
ALT:
HOG: 0001 3 5
(5) Keep pushing the up (or down) arrow button located
below the ALT button until the highlighted command
altitude reaches to the desired value (28,000 ft).
/- COMMAND-,
WXRPOS DATA SPDALTHOG
ASTETA: 6
SPD: 600
ALT:
HDO :000
(6) Restore buttons:
ALT button -> OFF
ND Mode Selector -> MAP mode
(7) Push the ATC Button (CLR)
to clear the ATC Panel.
Changing Airspeed
Command: e.g.'Set airspeed to 450'
Procedure:
(1) Adjust both throttles to set the airspeed to the
desired value (450).
(2) Push the ATC Button (ACK) in the ATC Communication
Panel.
(3) Set the ND Mode Selector to PLAN mode ('PLN').
(4)Push the SPD button (SPD button -> ON)
(5) Keep pushing the up (or down) arrow button located
below the SPD button until the highlighted command
airspeed reaches to the desired value (450).
(6) Restore buttons:SPD button -> OFF
ND Mode Selector -> MAP mode
(7) Push the ATC Button (CLR) to clear the ATC Pane].
AFc
1"); '1;C'
711
PLH 1u
40 SO 150
640
COMMAND-,
WXRPUS DATA SP°ALT
.11101111=0,
Descent to 281106 REQ
-,uns,.k ACK
CLR136
8. Correct/Acknowledge System Faults
When a subsystem malfunction or abnormality occurs, a
message will appear on the main EICAS if a pilot flies the
simulator without the FTD (Flight Task Display).A
subsystem malfunction message will appear on the FTD if a
pilot flies with the FTD.To compensate for this situation
(except for the landing gear system fault), follow the
procedure below:
(1) Bring up the system synoptic associated with the fault
message on the Auxiliary EICAS.
(2) Bring up the corresponding display page on the CDU.
(3) Asses the condition of the subsystem from the system
synoptic on the Auxiliary EICAS.
(4) a. If an alert condition (red message) exists, push the
reset button on the CDU.When there are two reset
buttons on the CDU, the left button should be pushed to
correct the left side system fault; the right button
should be pushed to correct the right side system
fault.It will take ten seconds for the correction to
take effect.Make sure the alert message goes away.
b. If an inform condition (yellow message) exists, push
the acknowledge button on the CDU.When there are two
acknowledge buttons, the left button is to acknowledge
the left side system abnormality; the right button is
to acknowledge the right side system abnormality.It
will take ten seconds for the acknowledgement to take
effect.Make sure the inform message goes away.
c. If a normal condition exists (no red or yellow on
the display), it is a false alarm.To abort the
warning message, push the cancel button.It will take
ten seconds for the cancelation to take effect.Make
sure the message goes away.
9. Correct/Acknowledge Source Selector Faults
The source selector on the Source Select Panel has to be
adjusted when a problem occurs.Follow the procedure below:
(1) Observe the fault message type.
(2) a. If an alert condition (red message) exists, turn the
problematic source selector to set to another mode.
It will take ten seconds for the correction to take
effect.
b. If an inform condition (yellow message) exists,
bring up the SOURCE SELECT page on the CDU.There
will be four acknowledge buttons for the source
selectors ('FLT DIR','EIU','NAV', and 'IRS').
Push the button which indicates the problematic
source selector to acknowledge the condition.It
will take seven seconds for the acknowledgement to
take effect.10.Inflight Engine Restart
When an engine failure occurs during flight, the pilot
should perform the inflight engine restart procedure as
follows:
(1) Shut down the
throttle for
the affected
engine.
(2) Shut off the
fuel supply
to the affected
engine.
(3) Fly to the inflight restart envelop
(altitude < 30,000).(Stay below 30,000 ft until the
end of this procedure.)
(4) Set up the correct
configuration:
STBY knob -> affected engine
AUTO knob -> affected engine
CON button -> ON
START button on
affected engine -> ON
137(5) Supply fuel to
the affected
engine.
(6) Open both
throttles
over 50%.
100
80
60
443
20
IDLE
(7) Observe Ni to
more than 50% in
the Main EICAS.
(After Ni has been
increased to more
than 50%, the
throttle may be
moved to the
desired setting
associated with
the current
command airspeed.)(8) Restore the engine control buttons:
START button on affected engine -> OFF
CON button -> OFF
AUTO knob -> BOTH
STBY knob -> NORM
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11. Task Priority Table
A pilot should perform multiple, concurrent flighttasks
according to their priorities.Red messages will be shown
for the tasks with priority 4or higher; and yellow messages
will be shown for the tasks with priority 3or lower.The
following table shows the priorities of flighttasks the
pilot should perform in the experiment.
Pri-
ority Problems
7 Controlled Flight
Into Terrain (CFIT)
6 Engine Shutdown
5 Engine-related
faults
4 Subsystem faults
other than engine
Source selector
faults
Aircraft control
during descent,
approach, & land
3 Subsystem or
source selector
abnormalities
(informative)
- Aircraft control
during climb and
cruise
Comply with
ATC commands
2 Subsystem or
source selector
faults (informing
that a backup
system is in use)
1 Autopilot fault
Messaaes
'Climb Climb!!'
'Restart Engine'
'EGT High'
'Engine Oil Low'
'ECS Bus Fault'
'Maintain Fuel Supply'
( <3,000 ibs)...
'Center EIU Fault'
'Left IRS Fault'...
'Maintain Airspeed'
'Maintain Altitude'
'Maintain Heading'
'Set Flap'
'Right HYD Valve'
'Maintain Fuel Supply'
( <5,000 lbs)
'Balance Fuel'...
'Left IRS On DC'
'Maintain Airspeed'
'Maintain Altitude'
'Maintain Heading'
'Set Flap'
'Reset command altitude
'Reset command airspeed
'EES On
- 'EIU On
'NAV On
Backup'
Backup'
Backup'
'Restore Autopilot'
Message
shown in
FTD
FTD
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
FTD
FTD
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
FTD
FTD
FTD
FTD
FTD/EICAS
FTD
FTD
FTD/EICAS
FTD
FTD
FTD
FTD
FTD
FTD
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
FTD141
Appendix C. Flight Paths and Altitude Profiles
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Figure A.5 Altitude profile: approach and land scenario.146
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Appendix D. Design of Flight Scenarios
Design of Flight ScenariosOriginal path Alternate path Storm area
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Figure A.14 Training scenario A: flight paths, waypoints, and weather.- Proper control of altitude, speed, and heading.
- Replanning of flight path before waypoint ALT.
- Management of fuel system when needed.
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Figure A.15 Training scenario A: regular tasks.
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Figure A.16 Training scenario A: abnormal tasks.
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Figure A.17 Training scenario B: flight paths, waypoints, and weather.159
- Proper control of altitude, speed, and heading.
- Replanning of flight path before waypoint TED.
- Management of fuel system when needed.
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Figure A.18 Training scenario B: regular tasks.160
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Figure A.19 Training scenario B: abnormal tasks.161
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Figure A.20 Data-collection scenario A: flight path design.Original path Alternate path Storm area
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Figure A.21 Data-collection scenario A: flight paths, waypoints, and weather.Proper control of altitude, speed, and heading.
- Replanning of flight path before waypoint FOX.
- Management of fuel system when needed.
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Figure A.22 Data-collection scenario A: regular tasks.
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Figure A.23 Data-collection scenario A: abnormal tasks.165
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Figure A.24 Data-collection scenario B: flight path design.Original path Alternate path
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Figure A.25 Data-collection scenario B: flight paths, waypoints, and weather.- Proper control of altitude, speed, and heading.
- Replanning of flight path before waypoint CBS
- Management of fuel system when needed.
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Figure A.26 Data-collection scenario B: regular tasks.PHD
CON
CAT
168
5. EESTempHigh (4)
4. ECS-APU2 (4)
16. RightHYDVaIve (3)
10. EGTHigh (4/FA)
". Descend to 7000 (3/ATC comm.)
9. Engine Shutdown (6)
13. FDOnBackup (2)
15. LeftHYDPressHigh (4/FA)
6. EESOnBackup (2)
20. FMC(CDU)Fault (4)
ECSBusFault (4)
21. NAVOnBackup (2)
1. Autopilot Fault (1)
7. EIUFault (4)
Set speed to 530 (3/ATC comm.)
9. Engine Shutdown (6)
14. LeftHYDPressHigh (4)
6. EESOnBackup (2/FA)
17. IRSFauIt (4)
PAT
11. EngineOilLow (5/FA)
3. ECSBusFault (4/FA)
18. LeftIRSOnDC (2)
KIM
Figure A.27 Data-collection scenario B: abnormal tasks.169
Appendix E. Mnemonic Pad for Three Basic Operation Tips
-Startatask ASAP.
-Make sure to complete a task.
-Always prioritize.170
Appendix F. Informed Consent
Informed Consent Document
I understand this study involves research which is being
conducted by a graduate student at Oregon State University.
I also understand that this experiment will test my skills
for simulated flight management in a flight simulator.I am
aware that this is an unpaid experiment.Though the changes
of risks are minimal, there will be possible psychological
stress during this experiment.
I am aware that it will take two consecutive days four hours
on each day.For the first two hours on the first day, the
evaluator will teach me how to fly the flight simulator.For
the next two hours on the first day and for the first two
hours on the second day,I will fly four simulated flight
scenarios (one hour per scenario) for training purposes.
After the six-hour training session, I will fly two simulated
flight scenarios for the purpose of data collection.While I
am flying the two scenarios, my performance will be recorded
on the simulator and the evaluator will video-tape the
computer screens.After the simulator flights, I will be
asked to answer a questionnaire concerning my opinions about
the experiment.The tapes and questionnaires will never be
used for anything other than the research in question.
My identification will not be recorded or released to any
other persons or publications.All reference to the subjects
of this experiment will be number coded, and any identity-
related information will be discarded after this research by
the evaluator.
Questions about the research, my rights, or any aspects of my
participation in it should be directed to Ken Funk or Joong
Nam Kim.I understand the University does not provide a
research subject with compensation or medical treatment in
the event the subject is injured as a result of participation
in this experiment.
,understand this
participation is voluntary, and my refusal to participate at
any time will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which
I am otherwise entitled.
name signature date171
Appendix G. Subject Training Procedure
SUBJECT TRAINING PROCEDURE
* Make the subject feel free to ask any questions anytime. *
<First Day>
11] 1. Set up flight simulator displays (all 4 machines).
111 2. Explain about the simulator using the displays, 'BASIC CONTROLS AND
DISPLAYS,' and 'FLIGHT MANUAL.'
3. Make the subject fly the training scenario 'Train Basic.'
- Teach how to control altitude, airspeed, and heading.
- Teach how to reroute flightpath. (Mention that the subject should complete this
procedure before arriving the 'reference' waypoint.)
111 4. Make the subject fly the training scenario `TrainSysFaults.'
- Teach how to compensate for system malfunctions.
- Teach how to comply with ATC commands.
- Teach how to 'Maintain Fuel Supply.'
- Teach how to 'Balance Fuel.'
5. Make the subject fly the training scenario `TrainAppAndLand.'
6. More explanation and reminder:
When the aircraft arrives at each waypoint, command values will be changed.
- The alert and warning messages that will not appear on the Main EICAS are :
`Restart Engine,' Maintain Fuel Supply,' Balance Fuel "Autopilot Fault,'
`Comply with ATC Command,Maintain Heading,' Maintain Altitude,'
`Maintain Airspeed,' and 'Set Flap.'
- No warning/alert bells for unsatisfactory control values when fly wo/ FTD.
- Performance measures: (1) # of misprioritizations, (2) task initiation time,
(3) unsatisfactory control, and (4) # of incompleted tasks.
111 7. Give the quiz.
111 8. Make the subject fly two training scenarios.
<Second Day>
111 9. Remind the subject
- how to reroute flightpath
- how to comply with ATC commands
- how to correct system faults
10. Make the subject fly two training scenarios.
11. Make the subject fly two data-collection scenarios.Appendix H. Aircraft Subsystem Fault Cases
Aircraft Subsystem Fault Cases
index: class name (instance name)
Autopilot (theAutopilot)
172
False alarm# of keysPriority
1.problem: 'AUTOPILOT FAULT'
message: 'Restore Autopilot' 4 1
color: red
solution: [theAutopilot canEngage]
ECS (theECS)
2.problem: `ECSBUSFAULT'
message: `ECSBusFaule 5 4
color: red
solution: [theECS canReset: 1]
3.problem: `ECSBUSFAULTFALSEALARM'
message: `ECSBusFaulf FA 5 4
color: red
solution: [theECS canCancel]
4.problem: `ECSAPU2'
message: `ECS-APU2' 5 4
color: red
solution: [theECS canReset: 6]
EES (theEES)
5.problem: `EESTemperatureHigh'
message: `EESTempHigh' 5 4
color: red
solution: [theEES canReset: 1]
6.problem: 'BACKUP'
message: TESOnBackup' FA 5 2
color: yellow
solution: [theEES canCancel]EIU (theElU)
7.problem:
message:
color:
solution:
i.e.problem:
message:
problem:
message:
problem:
message:
problem:
message:
8.problem:
message:
color:
solution:
'<current EIU mode>'
EIUFault'
red
[theEIU stillFault not]
`L'
`LeftEIUFaulf
`C'
`CenterEIUFaule
`R'
`RightEIUFaulf
`AUTO'
`AutoEIUFaule
`BACKUP'
`EIU0nBackup'
yellow
[theEIU acknowledged]
Engine (theRightEngine, theLeftEngine)
9.problem:
message:
color:
solution:
10. problem:
message:
color:
solution:
11. problem:
message:
color:
solution:
`FLAME OUT'
`Restart Engine'
red
[theRightEngine flameOut not]
`EGT HIGH'
`EGTHigh'
red
[theRightEngine canCancel]
'ENG OIL LOW'
`EngineOilLow'
red
[theLeftEngine canCancel]
173
False alarm# of keysPriority
1
5
4
2
(X) 1
FA 5 5
FA 5 5174
False alarm# of keysPriority
FliehtDirector (theFD)
12. problem: '<current FD mode>'
message: FDFault' 1 4
color: red
solution: [theFD stillFault not]
i.e.problem:'1.;
message: `LeftFDFaulf
problem: 'C'
message: `CenterFDFaule
problem: 'R'
message: `RightFDFaule
13. problem: 'BACKUP'
message: `FDOnBackup' 3 2
color: yellow
solution: [theFD acknowledged]
HydraulicSystem (theHYD)
14. problem: `LeftHYDPressAlert'
message: `LeftHYDPressHigh' 5 4
color: red
solution: [theHYD canReset: 1]
15. problem: 'falseAlarm'
message: `LeftHYDPressHigh' FA 5 4
color: red
solution: [theHYD canCancel]
16. problem: 'HYDRightValve'
message: `RightHYDValve' 5 3
color: yellow
solution: [theHYD canReset: 7]
IRS (theIRS)
17. problem: '<current IRS mode>'
message: IRSFault' 1 4
color: red
solution: [theIRS stillFault not]i.e.problem:
message:
problem:
message:
problem:
message:
18. problem:
message:
color:
solution:
19. problem:
message:
color:
solution:
`L'
`LeflIRSFaule
`C'
`CenterIRSFaule
`R'
`RightIRSFaule
`I, ON DC
`LeftIRSOnDC'
yellow
[theIRS acknowledged]
`BACKUP'
`IRSOnBacicup'
yellow
[theIRS acknowledged]
Navigation (theNAV)
20. problem:
message:
color:
solution:
i.e.problem:
message:
problem:
message:
problem:
message:
problem:
message:
21. problem:
message:
color:
solution:
'<current Navigation mode>'
FMCFault' orCDUFauIt'
red
[theNAV stillFault not]
`FMC L'
`LeftFMCFaulf
`FMC R'
`RightFMCFaule
`CDU L'
`LeftCDUFaulf
`CDU R
`RightCDUFaule
`BACKUP'
`NAVOnBackup'
yellow
[theNAV acknowledged]
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False alarm# of keysPriority
3
3
1
3
3
2
4
2176
Appendix I. Quiz
QUIZ
1. Match the related items between the two columns.
FMC
N1
FD
CDU
EGT
NAV
NAV DATA
Engine
Source Selector
2. You are in a situation to perform two concurrent tasks
associated with two cases of system abnormalities.To
which one should you respond first?Check both if it is
indifferent.
a. [] Altitude is off limit during Descent phase.
[ ]'Left HYD Press High'(red)
b. [] 'FD On Backup'(yellow)
[ ]'Left HYD Valve'(yellow)
c. [ ]'Descent to 30,000' in ATC communication panel.
[]Center tank, which is the only fuel tank being used,
has 4,000 lbs of fuel available for engines.
d. [] 'Right HYD Valve'(yellow)
[ ]'EES Temp High'(red)
e. []The center tank is empty, and main tanks have 1,000
lbs of fuel available for engines.
[ ]'EGT High'(yellow)
f. [] Airspeed is off limit during Cruise phase.
[ ]'EES On Backup'(yellow)
g. []The aircraft is landing.Center tank is empty,
mainl tank has 2,200 lbs of fuel, and main2 tank has
2,900 lbs of fuel available for engines.
[ ]'Left EIU Fault'(red)
h. []The aircraft is descending in final approach.All
of a sudden, you found that the current altitude is
just 100 feet above ground.
[] 'Restart Engine'(red)177
3. Answer what the abbreviations stand for.
<example> ENG -> (engine ) FUE -> (fuel system )
a.ND-> e.TOD->
b.FD-> f.GER->
c.OM-> g.ACK->
d.DH-> h.EGT->
4. You are corresponding a system fault 'ECS Bus Fault'
(red), and you have one last button push (`RESET') left to
finish the task.Then, a message 'Restart Engine'(red)
appeared on the screen.'Restart Engine' task has higher
priority than correcting 'ECS Bus Fault' task.What shall
you do in this situation.
[]Finish the current task by pushing the last button,
and start 'Restart Engine' task.
[]Start 'Restart Engine' task first and finish it.
Then, go back to 'ECS Bus Fault' task.
5. OM is located ( )miles before the final waypoint.
Land phase begins ( )miles before the final
waypoint.
DH is ( )ft above ground.
6. Match the related items between the two columns.
ENG
Auto EIU
HYD
Center FD
Right CDU
Left FMC
Fuel System
Landing Gear
Left IRS
Subsystem
Source Selector178
Appendix J. Questionnaire and Selected Results
Questionnaire
Please circle (only one) your response as indicated in the
following question.Answer them with the first thought
that comes to your mind, i.e., answer them ASAP.
1.I think the first flight was more difficult than the
second one.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
2.I felt that the evaluator gave me enough information to do
the experiment.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
3.I think the training session should be longer.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
4.I really had a lot of trouble trying to figure out what
the message were referring to (i.e., what they meant).
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
5.I think it was very difficult for me to remember all the
procedures to perform the tasks which require many
actions.(e.g., adding and deleting a waypoint for
rerouting a flightpath, complying with an ATC command, or
performing the 'Restart Engine' task).
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
6. For the tasks which do not require many actions (e.g.,
correcting 'Engine Oil Low' system fault, or correcting
`Left IRS Fault' source selector fault),I think it was
still very difficult for me to remember all the procedures
to perform.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
7.I try to perform tasks according to their priorities as
much as possible.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
8. The warning/alert bells were very helpful to my
performance.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
9.I felt that the tasks which came in a batch overloaded me.
strongly agree agreeno opinion disagree strongly disagree179
10. The display section labeled 'SUGGESTED' in the FTD
(Flight Task Display) was very helpful to my performance.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
11. The display section labeled 'UPCOMING' in the FTD was
very helpful to my performance.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
12. The display section labeled 'IN-PROGRESS' in the FTD was
very helpful to my performance.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
13. I consciously reminded myself to check the fuel system
and engine.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
14. In general,I tried to finish up one task before I
started another one even if I knew that the current task
had lower priority than the other.
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
15. If I do the tests again,I will perform
strongly agree agree no opinion disagree strongly disagree
16. Are you a currently certified pilot ? yes no
If no, were you ever a certified pilot ? yes no
Please describe any comments to make if you have.
(This section is for the evaluator.)
Subject #: Treatment order:Table A.1 Selected results of subject opinions.
Questions
strongly
a reeagree
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no strongly
opinion disagree disagree
1.I think the flight with the CTMS
was more difficult than without it. 25% 50% 12.5% 12.5%
2. I felt that the evaluator gave me
enough information to do the
experiment.
25% 75%
3. I think the training session should
be longer. 25% 25% 25% 25%
4. The waming/alert bells were very
helpful to my performance. 50% 50%
5. The display section labeled
`SUGGESTED' in the FTD was
very helpful to my performance.
25% 37.5% 37.5%
6. The display section labeled
`UPCOMING' in the FTD was
very helpful to my performance.
37.5% 25% 37.5%
7. The display section labeled 'IN-
PROGRESS' in the FTD was
very helpful to my performance.
50% 12.5%37.5%
8. If I do the tests again, I will
perform much better. 12.5% 75% 12.5%181
Appendix K. Priority Table
Pri-
ority Problems
Priority Table
7 Controlled Flight
Into Terrain (CFIT)
6 Engine Shutdown
5 Engine-related
faults other than
Engine Shutdown
4 Subsystem faults
other than engine
Source selector
faults
Aircraft control
during descent,
approach,& land
3 Subsystem or
source selector
abnormalities
(informative)
Aircraft control
during climb and
cruise
Comply with
ATC commands
2 Subsystem or source
selector faults
(informing that a
backup system is
being used)
1 Autopilot fault
Message
'Climb Climb!!'
'Restart Engine'
'EGT High'
'Engine Oil Low'
Message
shown in
FTD
FTD
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
'ECS Bus Fault' FTD/EICAS
'Lower Landing Gear'FTD/EICAS
'Maintain Fuel Supply' FTD
(< 3,000 lbs)...
'Center EIU Fault'
'Left IRS Fault'
'Left FMC Fault'...
'Maintain Airspeed'
'Maintain Altitude'
'Maintain Heading'
'Set Flap'
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
FTD
FTD
FTD
FTD
'Right HYD Valve' FTD/EICAS
'Maintain Fuel Supply' FTD
(< 5,000 lbs)
'Balance Fuel' FTD
'Left IRS On DC'... FTD/EICAS
'Maintain Airspeed'
'Maintain Altitude'
'Maintain Heading'
'Set Flap'
FTD
FTD
FTD
FTD
'Reset command altitude' FTD
'Reset command airspeed' FTD
'EES On Backup'
'EIU On Backup'
'NAV On Backup'...
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
FTD/EICAS
'Restore Autopilot' FTDAppendix L. Checklist
NORMAL CHECKLIST
CLIMB(INITIAL)
1. HEADING
2. ALTITUDE
3. AIRSPEED
AS REQUIRED
AS REQUIRED
AS REQUIRED
4. MAP SWITCHES (WXR,POS,DATA)
5. FUEL SYSTEM SYNOPTIC . . . .DISPLAYED
6. CLIMB CHK COMPLETE
AFTER EACH WAYPOINT
1. HEADING AS REQUIRED
2. ALTITUDE AS REQUIRED
3. AIRSPEED AS REQUIRED
4. WEATHER CHECKED
5. AFTER WAYPOINT CHK COMPLETE
NOTE: Minl and main2 pumps should be on when the
center tank has less than 10K lbs of fuel.
AFTER TOP OF DESCENT (TOD)
1. ALTITUDE AS REQUIRED
2. AIRSPEED AS REQUIRED
3. AFTER TOD CHK COMPLETE
NOTE:TOD is located at the half way between the
last waypoint in cruise and the first
waypoint in descent.
APPROACH
1. HEADING AS REQUIRED
2. ALTITUDE AS REQUIRED
3. AIRSPEED AS REQUIRED
4. FLAPS AS REQUIRED
5. LANDING GEAR DOWN & LOCKED
6. APPROACH CHK COMPLETE
NOTE:If current airspeed is :220 185 150
then flap angle should be:102025
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EMERGENCY/ABNORMAL
CHECKLIST
BALANCING FUEL
FUEL VALVES (BOTH) OPEN
FUEL PUMP (LOW QUANTITY TANK) . . .OFF
MONITOR FUEL QUANTITY . .UNTIL BALANCED
FUEL PUMP (THAT WAS OFF) ON
CLOSE FUELVALVES (BOTH)
NOTE:Fuel is unbalanced if the difference in fuel
amount between mains and main2 tanks is more
than 0.5K lbs.
COMPLY WITH ATC COMMANDS
ATC BUTTON (ACK) PUSH
IF THE COMMAND IS AIRSPEED CHANGE:
AIRSPEED AS COMMANDED
IF THE COMMAND IS ALTITUDE CHANGE:
ALTITUDE AS COMMANDED
ND MODE SELECTOR
COMMAND BUTTON (SPD OR ALT) ON
COMMAND VALUE AS COMMANDED
COMMAND BUTTON (SPD OR ALT) OFF
ND MODE SELECTOR MAP MODE
ATC BUTTON (CLR) PUSH
CORRECT/ACKNOWLEDGE
SYSTEM FAULT
(ENG/HYD/ECS/EES)
SYSTEM SYNOPTIC (AFFECTED) . . .DISPLAY
CDU SUBSYSTEMS
ASSOCIATED SYSTEM BUTTON PUSH
IF ALERT CONDITION (RED) EXISTS:
RESET BUTTON PUSH
IF INFORM CONDITION (YELLOW) EXISTS:
ACK BUTTON PUSH
IF FALSE ALARM (NO RED OR YELLOW):
CANCEL BUTTON PUSH
RETURN/MAIN BUTTON PUSH
NOTE:When there are two reset/ack buttons, push
left button to correct/acknowledge left side
system fault/abnormality; push right button
to correct/acknowledge right side system
fault/abnormality.It takes 10 seconds for
the action to take effect.Make sure the
message goes away.EMERGENCY/ABNORMAL
CHECKLIST (CONT'D)
CORRECT/ACKNOWLEDGE
SOURCE SELECTOR FAULT
(FD /NAV /EIU /IRS)
IF ALERT CONDITION (RED) EXISTS:
SOURCE SELECTOR . . . .TO ANOTHER MODE
IF INFORM CONDITION (YELLOW) EXISTS:
CDU SOURCE SELECT
ASSOCIATED SOURCE SEL BUTTON . . .PUSH
MAIN BUTTON PUSH
ROTE:It takes 10 seconds for the correction,
7 seconds for the acknowledgement to take
effect.Make sure the message goes away.
RESTORE AUTOPILOT
CDU SUBSYSTEMS
AUTOPILOT BUTTON PUSH
RESTORE BUTTON PUSH
RETURN/MAIN BUTTON PUSH
INFLIGHTENGINE RESTART
THROTTLE(AFFECTED ENGINE) IDLE
FUEL SUPPLY TO AFFECTED ENGINE . .CUTOFF
ALTITUDE BELOW 30,000 FT
STBY KNOB TO AFFECTED ENGINE
AUTO KNOB TO AFFECTED ENGINE
CON BUTTON ON
START BUTTON ON AFFECTED ENGINE . . ON
FUEL SUPPLY TO AFFECTED ENGINE . .OPEN
BOTH THROTTLES OVER 50%
MONITOR N1 UNTIL OVER 50%
ENGINE CTRL BUTTONS AND KNOBS . .RESTORE
ALTITUDE AS COMMANDED
LANDING GEAR NOT LOCKED
LANDING GEAR SYNOPTIC DISPLAY
GROUP 1 :LANDING GEAR UP AND DOWN
LANDING GEAR UP
LANDING GEAR DOWN
REPEAT GROUP 1 . . . .UNTIL GEAR LOCKED
NOTE:It takes 5 seconds to transition the gear.
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REROUTEFLIGHTPATH
GROUP 1 :Send request message to ATC.
ATC BUTTON (REQ) PUSH
TYPE MESSAGE USING KEYBOARD
<ENTER> KEY (ON KEYBOARD) HIT
MONITOR ATC PANEL FOR ATC REPLY
.If the request is approved, push ATC
button (CLR) to clear ATC panel, and
proceed to the next step.
.If not, go back to GROUP I.
ND MODE SELECTOR PLAN MODE
CDU NAV DATA
GROUP 2: Add and/or delete a waypoint.
GROUP 2A :Add a waypoint
REFERENCE WAYPOINT
ADD AFTER BUTTON
WAYPOINT TO ADD
ADD BUTTON
SELECT
PUSH
SELECT
PUSH
GROUP 2B :Delete a waypoint.
WAYPOINT TO DELETE SELECT
DELETE BUTTON PUSH
MAIN BUTTON PUSH
NOTE:Example text for add request to ATC
-> 'Request to add ABC after CBS'
Example text for delete request to ATC
-> 'Request to delete NBC'184
Appendix M. Subject Performance Score Cards
Subject Performance Score Card
Subject #:5 Treatment #:7-14-4".TX
w/ CTMS wo/ CTMS
(1) # of misprioritizations 7 54,
(2) # of opportunities .24Z 6
(3) = (1) / (2) * 100 2.f. /1 % 6+6.17-
(4) Task initiation (second) /4Z. ,2-3/3. 8g
(5) Unsatisfactory airspeed 7.g- .--3
(6) Unsatisfactory altitude Z7' 23 f
(7) Unsatisfactory heading /.2-6 4(0
(8) = ((5) + (8)4- (7))/ 3 714- 0 b7'.3
(9) Total simulation time /4gl /S..&-f
(10) = (8)/(9) * 100 4.: 11 %3. 21
(11) # of incomplete tasks .2. 0185
Subject Performance Score Card
Subject #:517 Treatment #:7-30-r2e
w/ CTMS wo/ CTMS
(1) # of misprioritizations 4Z 0
(2) # of opportunities 7 7-
(3) = (1) / (2) * 100 /0. 24 %D. o o
(4) Task initiation (second) /4l. o4Cf- zg
(5) Unsatisfactory airspeed /Ot /2 3
(6) Unsatisfactory altitude /4f
(7) Unsatisfactory heading 4ze, 3.2-
(8)= ((5) + (6) + (7))/ 3 el-' 3 /Ct. 3
(9) Total simulation time /fgt/93,
(10) = (8) /(9)* 100 -/41 °/49 23 ro
(11) #of incomplete tasks 0 3186
Subject Performance Score Card
Subject #:597- Treatment #:T.--7-- 7-99
w/ CTMS wo/ CTMS
(1)#of misprioritizations 2- g
(2) # of opportunities 5 /9
(3) = (1)/ (2) * 100 -C--. 00 %,1... i/ %
(4) Task initiation (second) g /44.63
(5) Unsatisfactory airspeed /8 7f
(6) Unsatisfactory altitude 61/7
(7) Unsatisfactory heading -.4...///
(8) =((8) + (8) + (7))1 3 V 3 //7. 7-
(9) Total simulation time /go?/7,-7-
(10) = (8)/ (9)* 100 /.7-30 Z.2/%
(11) # of incomplete tasks 0187
Subject Performance Score Card
Subject #:5 Le- Treatment #:736 Y9'
w/ CTMS wo/ CTMS
(1) # of misprioritizations 6
(2) # of opportunities .14 2---
(3) = (1)/(2)* 100 -0- e3%24.00 a%)
(4) Task initiation (second) Zi. 4e/ /7. 7.-.
(5) Unsatisfactory airspeed /I /9k
(6) Unsatisfactory altitude 7-2-
(7) Unsatisfactory heading 13 lo 3
(8) =((8) + (6) ± (7))I 3 4:4- q" 42-3.3
(9) Total simulation time /9.-.7- 2.o.7-3
(10) = (8) / (9)* 100 V.-. 7o% ei. AO Vo
(11) # of incomplete tasks / /188
Subject Performance Score Card
Subject #:se7 Treatment #:TB/T3/
w/ CTMS wo/ CTMS
(1) # of misprioritizations .7- /0
(2) # of opportunities /7 3t.
(3) = (1) /(2) * 100 /1. 7X2-9. ?%
(4) Task initiation (second) /3. a _4./8
(5) Unsatisfactory airspeed AP 3 I/O
(6) Unsatisfactory altitude f6 /73
(7) Unsatisfactory heading /8.&-' 37t'
(8) = ((5) + (6) + (7))/ 3 /2.6. 0 27-1. 0
(9) Total simulation time 476 18/8
(10) = (8) / (9) * 100 1. $2-`1042. -3%
(11) # of incomplete tasks 0 44.189
Subject Performance Score Card
Subject #:578 Treatment #: Ttg
w/ CTMS wo/ CTMS
(1) # of misprioritizations 0 6
(2) # of opportunities 23 /$
(3) = (1) / (2) * 100 CP.oe%39.33490
(4) Task initiation (second) /7-- ig2-P. g
(5) Unsatisfactory airspeed 2__og 97
(6) Unsatisfactory altitude /0 2-.2.
(7) Unsatisfactory heading /4 4Z /2.5"-
(8) = ((8) ± (6) ± (7))/3 /31. ?-/.4/.0
(9) Total simulation time /7?3 2._ct04--
(10) = (8)/(9) * 100 q-.46.2_ e' 349/,
(11) # of incomplete tasks / 4Z190
Subject Performance Score Card
Subject #:5'38 Treatment #:T3' T36
w/ CTMS wo/ CTMS
(1) # of misprioritizations 6 /6
(2) # of opportunities 344
(3) = ( 1 )/ (2) * 100 / 7. 4 %32.. 00 %
(4) Task initiation (second) 2/- -/ 32. 07
(5) Unsatisfactory airspeed / 7 .t-
(6) Unsatisfactory altitude 2/7 x-38
(7) Unsatisfactory heading /ti/ .233
(8) = ((5) + (6) + (7))/ 3 4.47o/7-7 .7
(9) Total simulation time .2-120 2-7-2-8
(10) = (8)/ (9) * 100 g.-7-3%7. 4?%
(11)#of incomplete tasks 0 4191
Subject Performance Score Card
Subject #:52-7- Treatment #:TaT7.2-
w/ CTMS wo/ CTMS
(1) # of misprioritizations .2-
(2) # of opportunities 2..c. 8
(3) = (1) /(2)* 100 3,--. Do %2-: oo
(4) Task initiation (second) l":37 7. 344
(5) Unsatisfactory airspeed t'. 8/
(6) Unsatisfactory altitude /oz EA-
(7) Unsatisfactory heading 4L/ 27
(8) = ((5)4-(6) + (7))/ 3 a-0 --7 3
(9) Total simulation time /7.2 t /53 2.
(10)= (8)/(9)* 100 3.43°/e,3. 0 -Vo
(1 1 ) #of incomplete tasks 0 /192
Appendix N. Experimental Results Aggregation Procedure
Experimental Results Aggregation Procedure
Tally the total # of misprioritizations (use t00.dat and task activity charts):
1. Remove control tasks (26,27,28) whose response times are less than 5 seconds
from ctmsdata.dat file printout (not 23's, though).
2. Find 'INCOMPLETE' tasks and mark them in the task activity charts.
3. Count the total # of misprioritizations.
- Consider priority change of 'MaintainFuel Supply' from 3 to 4.
Get task initiation times (use t00.dat, t00.sub, t00.nav):
4. Circle the tasks whose init times can be collected directly from ctmsdata.dat.
- 'Maintain Airspeed' task
- Red (priority >= 4) Source Selectorfaults
- 'Maintain Fuel Supply'
- 'Set Flap'
5. Write down task initiation times in t00.dat printout referring to t00.sub and t00.nay.
6. Write down task initiation times referring to the video tape.
7. Run Smalltalk program to get mean values (use class method).
Get proportion of unsatisfactory control tasks:
8. The Smalltalk program CtmsAnalyzer does it.
- Use t00.dat and/or t00.sub to get thesimulation end time.
(Unsatisfactory tasks for less than 5 seconds are also included in this process.
Simulation is regarded to end when the aircraft is fully configured for landing.)
Count 'incomplete' tasks (use t00.dat):
9. Count INCOMPLETE tasks.